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Exculpatory Evidence Pre-plea  
without Extending Brady 
Brian Sanders† 
Innocent defendants sometimes plead guilty. This is a problem. Some suggest 
fixing this problem with a constitutional requirement that prosecutors disclose ex-
culpatory evidence before a defendant pleads guilty. A circuit split has thus devel-
oped concerning whether Brady, which requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence, 
extends to the pre-plea context. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, however, likely 
bars a constitutional requirement for pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 
Faced with this exigency, this Comment argues that contract law should form the 
legal basis for pre-plea disclosure. Specifically, the contract doctrine of constructive 
fraud provides a suitable remedy. While big boy clauses, which defeat constructive 
fraud claims, initially appear disastrous to this regime, such clauses are likely the 
redeeming quality of a constructive fraud solution. To safeguard innocent defend-
ants from using big boy clauses, this Comment suggests open bargaining and mod-
ifications to judicial plea colloquies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
George is eighteen. He’s in ninth grade special education. 
And he’s in prison. 
One evening, law enforcement officers took George to a de-
tention facility on suspicion of public intoxication and automobile 
burglary. George tried to make a call at the facility, but the phone 
was broken. He banged the phone against its receiver and  
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gestured obscenely toward a security camera. Several officers at-
tempted to put George in a padded cell while he cooled off. But 
George didn’t want to go into a padded cell. A scuffle ensued. 
Four surveillance cameras captured the scene. The footage 
showed that George didn’t assault any officers. But no one told 
George about the footage, and the local district attorney’s office 
charged George with felonious assault on a public servant any-
way. Faced with a felony charge and without access to evidence 
that would prove his innocence, George did what he thought best. 
George pleaded guilty. 
Now, as George begins his eight-year prison sentence, there’s 
good news and bad news. The good news is that, although he 
doesn’t know it yet, George will eventually get his hands on the 
footage that proves his innocence. He’ll then use that to get out of 
prison. The bad news is that at eighteen years old, three years 
away from finishing high school, and in prison, George won’t find 
out about this footage for another four years.1 
* * * 
George Alvarez’s story epitomizes a significant problem in 
the US criminal justice system: innocent defendants sometimes 
plead guilty while prosecutors withhold exculpatory evidence. 
Courts define exculpatory evidence as evidence that is both “fa-
vorable” to a defendant and “material either to guilt or to punish-
ment.”2 As of 2019, 41 out of the 365 DNA exonerations in the US 
criminal justice system involved defendants who pleaded guilty 
 
 1 For the entire story put forward by the defendant, see Alvarez v City of  
Brownsville, 904 F3d 382, 385–88 (5th Cir 2018) (en banc). George Alvarez’s defense team 
gave a compelling story, but also a misleading one. In order to get habeas corpus relief, 
Alvarez’s attorneys submitted a video with the thirty seconds leading up to the alleged 
crime redacted. Id at 394 (Jones concurring). Those thirty seconds show Alvarez quarrel-
ing with officers and defying their instructions, such that his claim of actual innocence “is 
supportable only if one sees no more than the redacted video.” Id. Instead of objecting to 
the video, the DA’s office “immediately agreed to a new trial, and apparently offered an 
agreed set of findings and conclusions.” Id. Why did the government lawyers fail to object 
to the redacted video? While the record does not make it entirely clear, there are some 
suspicious facts: Alvarez’s attorney in his state habeas corpus case, Eduardo Lucio, was 
an indicted co-conspirator in a bribery prosecution of the district attorney of the county in 
which Alvarez was prosecuted. Id. Alvarez’s former attorney, who was an unindicted co-
conspirator in the same bribery prosecution, gave the supporting testimony for Alvarez’s 
appeal. Id. While these facts suggest that the Supreme Court should not use Alvarez to 
decide important issues, the defense version of the story still typifies the problem that this 
Comment addresses. 
 2 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963). 
2246 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:2243 
 
to crimes they did not commit.3 The actual number of innocent 
defendants who have pleaded guilty likely surpasses this statis-
tic, because pleas can be difficult to overturn4 and because con-
victed defendants often discover exculpatory evidence only by 
some fortuitous occurrence.5 
Many scholars blame prosecutors for failing to disclose excul-
patory evidence pre-plea (“pre-plea disclosure”), contending that 
such suppression is a significant cause of innocent people plead-
ing guilty.6 Nevertheless, federal circuit courts appear to disagree 
about whether the Constitution requires pre-plea disclosure.7 
This circuit split presents a fundamental question: Is there any 
legal basis for requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence before a defendant pleads guilty? 
Instead of resolving this question from a constitutional per-
spective, this Comment argues that contract law principles 
should form the legal basis for pre-plea disclosure. This approach 
is justifiable given that a persistent problem plagues current con-
stitutional arguments for pre-plea disclosure. While this Com-
ment discusses the constitutional argument in depth below, a 
brief discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals the obstacle 
that due process–based arguments for pre-plea disclosure face 
and that this Comment seeks to avoid. The Supreme Court in 
Brady v Maryland8 held that a prosecutor’s “suppression . . . of 
evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process.”9 While 
there is no doubt that Brady imposes duties on prosecutors by the 
time of trial, judges and scholars alike have argued that a prose-
cutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea, long be-
fore any trial, also violates a defendant’s due process right.10 
 
 3 DNA Exonerations in the United States (The Innocence Project, 2019), archived 
at http://perma.cc/5Q6H-EDC4. 
 4 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Brady, Trust, and Error, 13 Loyola J Pub Interest L 447, 
456 (2012). 
 5 See, for example, Alvarez, 904 F3d at 388 (stating that “the videos . . . surfaced 
during discovery for an unrelated § 1983 case”). 
 6 See, for example, Wiseman, 13 Loyola J Pub Interest L at 466 (cited in note 4). 
 7 Compare, for example, Alvarez, 904 F3d at 394, with McCann v Mangialardi, 337 
F3d 782, 788 (7th Cir 2003). 
 8 373 US 83 (1963). 
 9 Id at 87. 
 10 See, for example, Alvarez, 904 F3d at 416 (Costa dissenting) (“Due process requires 
more than we afford the accused today.”). For a summary of scholarship arguing that due 
process requires pre-plea disclosure, see generally Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers 
Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68  
Fordham L Rev 2011 (2000). 
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There is, however, a problem with inferring that Brady ex-
tends to the pre-plea context. In United States v Ruiz,11 the Court 
addressed impeachment evidence—which a party can use to un-
dermine a witness’s credibility12—holding that “the Constitution 
does not require the Government to disclose material impeach-
ment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”13 While due process arguments for pre-plea disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence often try to distinguish between the im-
peachment evidence mentioned in Ruiz and the exculpatory evi-
dence described in Brady,14 the Court in United States v Bagley15 
rejected this distinction.16 
This Comment refers to this problem as the Bagley/Ruiz syl-
logism: if exculpatory and impeachment evidence are constitu-
tionally indistinguishable, and if there is no constitutional re-
quirement for pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence, then 
there is good reason to think the Court might reject the notion 
that due process requires pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory  
evidence. 
While critics can posit that the premises of the syllogism are 
false,17 the plain language of Bagley and Ruiz strongly supports 
the conclusion that due process does not require pre-plea disclo-
sure. Moreover, although the Court often reviews writs of certio-
rari on the pre-plea disclosure issue, the Court has declined to 
take up this issue for nearly two decades.18 
Despite the Court’s reluctance to address the issue of pre-plea 
disclosure, litigants and scholars have expended vast resources 
arguing that due process requires pre-plea disclosure.19 Regard-
less, in many jurisdictions, defendants like George Alvarez re-
main incarcerated. Given the circuit split and the uphill battle 
 
 11 536 US 622 (2002). 
 12 Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 (1959). 
 13 Ruiz, 536 US at 633. 
 14 See, for example, McCann, 337 F3d at 787–88. 
 15 473 US 667 (1985). 
 16 Id at 676 (“This Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment 
evidence and exculpatory evidence.”). 
 17 See Part II. 
 18 See generally, for example, Conroy v United States, 559 US 941 (2010) (denying 
certiorari on a pre-plea disclosure issue); Smith v Mills, 555 US 830 (2008) (denying certi-
orari); Ohiri v United States, 555 US 1143 (2009) (denying certiorari); Alvarez v City of 
Brownsville, 139 S Ct 2690 (2019) (denying certiorari). 
 19 For a list of only a fraction of the many cases on which litigants have expended 
resources arguing for pre-plea disclosure, see Part II. For a list of some of the many articles 
arguing for pre-plea disclosure, see Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2083–84 (cited in  
note 10). 
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that due process arguments face, this Comment begins with the 
following question: If a defendant does not have a due process 
right to receive exculpatory evidence pre-plea, is there any other 
legal basis that requires pre-plea disclosure? This Comment ar-
gues that in many cases, prosecutors must still disclose exculpa-
tory evidence pre-plea, not on due process grounds, but instead 
on the basis of contract law. Specifically, this Comment argues 
that if a prosecutor withholds exculpatory evidence, a defendant 
may overturn his conviction by rescinding his plea agreement 
based on the doctrine of constructive fraud. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
Court’s exculpatory evidence jurisprudence, beginning with the 
basic due process right to exculpatory evidence, as expressed in 
Brady, and impeachment evidence, as expressed in Giglio v 
United States.20 United States v Agurs21 and Kyles v Whitley22 pro-
vide characteristics of exculpatory evidence that later inform this 
Comment’s discussion of constructive fraud. Next, this Part ex-
amines Bagley’s discussion of the relationship between exculpa-
tory evidence and impeachment evidence, along with Ruiz’s hold-
ing that the Constitution does not require pre-plea disclosure of 
impeachment evidence. Finally, this Part analyzes the syllogism 
that emerges from Bagley and Ruiz. 
Part II describes the federal circuit courts’ various possible 
responses to the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism. The Second, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, on the one hand, all appear to require 
pre-plea disclosure: they do so by (1) using procedure to circum-
vent the syllogism, (2) ignoring the syllogism, or (3) attacking one 
of the syllogism’s premises. The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, 
on the other hand, do not require pre-plea disclosure, character-
izing the rights to receive exculpatory evidence and impeachment 
evidence as trial rights and thereby affirming both premises of 
the syllogism. 
Part III argues that the solution to the circuit split does not 
rest on due process grounds at all, but instead on principles of 
contract law. This Part discusses how the elements of construc-
tive fraud—(1) a false representation, (2) reasonable reliance, 
(3) detriment, and (4) duty—are often present when a prosecutor 
fails to disclose exculpatory evidence. This Part also proposes that 
 
 20 405 US 150 (1972). 
 21 427 US 97 (1976). 
 22 514 US 419 (1995). 
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modifications to judicial plea colloquies can curb any abuses cre-
ated by so-called big boy clauses, which seek to contractually ne-
gate the “reasonable reliance” element of constructive fraud.23 
I.  BACKGROUND: FROM BRADY TO THE BAGLEY/RUIZ SYLLOGISM 
This Comment makes a contract law argument instead of a 
due process argument for pre-plea disclosure. The constitutional 
background, however, remains relevant for two reasons. First, the 
circuit split on this issue is based on constitutional law. Thus, to 
understand why this issue has generated divergent approaches, 
one must comprehend the precedents that produced the split. Sec-
ond, because all courts that require pre-plea disclosure have re-
lied on due process, this Comment bears the burden of showing 
why a contract law approach is preferable for both judges and lit-
igants. In short, the due process rationale for pre-plea disclosure 
is relevant to this Comment because it shows why contract law 
provides a superior solution. 
Thus, Part I.A reviews the Court’s original explication of the 
basic constitutional rights to receive exculpatory and impeach-
ment evidence in Brady and Giglio. Part I.B examines several 
cases in which the Court explicated characteristics of the rights it 
had created in those cases. Part I.C explains why the Bagley/Ruiz 
syllogism creates an obstacle to those who argue for pre-plea dis-
closure on due process grounds. 
A. The Court’s Creation of the Rights to Receive Exculpatory 
and Impeachment Evidence 
The Fifth Amendment says that “[n]o person shall be . . . de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”24 
Certain rights that go hand in hand with due process, such as the 
right to a jury trial25 and the right to confront accusers,26 appear 
in the constitutional text. The Supreme Court has also found that 
certain unenumerated rights fall within the ambit of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 
 
 23 Big boy clauses negate the “reasonable reliance” element of constructive fraud by 
asserting that a defendant pleaded guilty without reliance on any exculpatory evidence. 
 24 US Const Amend V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from 
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” US Const 
Amend XIV. 
 25 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 3. 
 26 US Const Amend VI. 
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In 1963, the Supreme Court in Brady announced one of these 
unenumerated rights, finding that the Due Process Clause in-
cludes the right to receive exculpatory evidence.27 John Brady and 
Donald Boblit had both participated in a murder.28 Before Brady 
went to trial, his counsel requested that the prosecutor turn over 
Boblit’s statements concerning the murder.29 The prosecutor pur-
ported to comply with this request, but in fact failed to turn over 
a statement in which Boblit confessed to the murder.30 At trial, 
Brady testified that he had participated in the crime, but had not 
committed the “actual killing.”31 
The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, “where the evidence [was] material either 
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution,” violated Brady’s due process right.32 
Concerns about justice animated the Court’s holding.33 The Court 
also noted that “[s]ociety wins” when “criminal trials are fair,” 
and the criminal justice system “suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly.”34 Thus, even though the Court’s justification 
comprised a single paragraph, it is clear that concerns about the 
justice and fairness of a trial bolstered Brady. 
Brady has some important limitations: in order to meet the 
Brady standard, exculpatory evidence must be both “favorable” to 
the accused35 and “material.”36 While one can glean definitions for 
each term from the surrounding text, Brady explicitly defined nei-
ther. Furthermore, Brady dealt only with situations in which the 
“prosecution [ ] withholds evidence on demand of an accused,” and 
not when a defendant fails to request exculpatory evidence.37 Fi-
nally, Brady did not address whether its holding applied to im-
peachment evidence. 
 
 27 373 US at 87. 
 28 Id at 84. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Brady, 373 US at 84. 
 32 Id at 87. 
 33 Id at 87–88. 
 34 Id at 87. 
 35 Brady, 373 US at 88 (describing favorable evidence as that which “tend[s] to ex-
culpate him or reduce the penalty”). 
 36 Id (describing materiality by asking “how much good Boblit’s undisclosed confes-
sion would have done Brady if it had been before the jury” or whether suppression of the 
evidence was “prejudicial to the defendant”). 
 37 Id (emphasis added). 
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The relationship between exculpatory and impeachment evi-
dence is crucial to this Comment’s conclusion that contract law is 
a preferable solution. Thus, it is worth pausing to explicate the 
nature of impeachment evidence before analyzing how the Court 
handles it. Impeachment evidence is evidence that affects the 
“truthfulness and reliability of a given witness” at trial, when 
that witness’s credibility “may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence.”38 Because impeachment evidence could be material 
and favorable to a defendant, impeachment evidence, at first 
glance, appears to be one variety of exculpatory evidence under 
Brady. However, it is factually distinct from exculpatory evidence 
in that its relevance depends on whether the prosecution intends 
to call the impeached witnesses at trial.39 
In 1972, about ten years after Brady, the Court addressed the 
relationship between impeachment evidence and exculpatory ev-
idence in Giglio.40 John Giglio was convicted of passing forged 
money orders.41 At trial, the only witness connecting Giglio to the 
crime was his co-conspirator Robert Taliento.42 Defense counsel 
later learned, however, that an individual at the US Attorney’s 
Office had promised Taliento that “if he testified before the grand 
jury and at trial he would not be prosecuted.”43 
Giglio held that evidence that impeached the credibility of 
Taliento, namely that he struck a deal with the government, fell 
within the general rule of Brady.44 As a consequence, prosecutors 
must disclose impeachment evidence to a defendant in order to 
avoid violating a defendant’s due process right.45 Giglio did not 
explicitly rely on Brady’s concern for a fair trial. The Court in-
stead concluded that “rudimentary demands of justice” dictated 
its holding.46 Thus, given the conclusion that impeachment evi-
dence falls within the Brady rule, the concerns underlying Brady 
likely illuminated Giglio’s reasoning, with a special emphasis on 
justice. 
In short, these two seminal cases established the due process 
rights to receive exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and 
 
 38 Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 (1959). 
 39 See Ruiz, 536 US at 629–30. 
 40 405 US 150 (1972). 
 41 Id at 150. 
 42 Id at 151. 
 43 Id at 152. 
 44 Giglio, 405 US at 154–55. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id at 153. 
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they signaled some connection between the two. Several aspects 
of the new rights, however, remained undefined after Giglio. 
First, the Court did not say whether due process requires disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence even when the defendant fails to re-
quest such evidence. Second, it was unclear to what extent a de-
fendant had to prove a prosecutor’s knowledge of exculpatory 
evidence. Third, the Court did not define the precise standard for 
determining whether exculpatory evidence is material. Fourth, 
the Court did not precisely define the relationship between im-
peachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. Finally, it was not 
clear when the rights to receive Giglio and Brady information at-
tached. Over the next few decades, several of the Court’s cases 
addressed these ambiguities. The next Section considers some of 
these cases, as their holdings and underlying rationales are cru-
cial to show that constructive fraud maps onto the typical excul-
patory evidence case. 
B. The Characteristics of the Rights to Receive Exculpatory 
and Impeachment Evidence 
This Section proceeds in two parts. First, it examines Agurs 
and Kyles, two cases that are not directly relevant to due process 
arguments for pre-plea disclosure, but that instead inform this 
Comment’s discussion of the duty and scienter requirements of 
constructive fraud. Second, this Section examines Bagley and 
Ruiz, two cases that together form the primary obstacle to a due 
process mandate for pre-plea disclosure. 
1. Agurs’s use of prosecutorial duty and Kyles’s scienter 
requirement. 
In Agurs, the Court concluded that a defendant is entitled to 
receive Brady material even when she fails to request it.47 Linda 
Agurs stabbed James Sewell.48 Agurs claimed self-defense, but 
the jury rejected her claim.49 Defense counsel failed to request ex-
culpatory evidence, but the defense later discovered that Sewell 
had a criminal record for assaults and carrying a deadly weapon, 
both of which would have supported Agurs’s self-defense claim.50 
 
 47 Agurs, 427 US at 107. 
 48 Id at 98. 
 49 Id at 100. 
 50 Id at 100–01. 
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The Court held that when exculpatory evidence is “material,”51 
fairness requires that prosecutors turn it over regardless of 
whether a defendant requests it.52 
In addition to fairness, the Court also relied on the concept of 
prosecutorial duty: the prosecutor has a duty to “prosecute the 
accused with earnestness and vigor”53 and to see that “justice 
shall be done.”54 This characterization of prosecutorial duties 
comes from Berger v United States,55 which describes the “twofold 
aim” of the prosecutor that “guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer.”56 Specifically, Agurs noted that “the prosecutor’s duty il-
luminates the standard of materiality that governs his obligation 
to disclose exculpatory evidence.”57 
Next, in Kyles, the Court also relied on prosecutorial duties 
in deciding whether a defendant had to prove a prosecutor’s 
knowledge of exculpatory evidence under Brady. Curtis Kyles al-
legedly shot a sixty-year-old woman in her left temple.58 The pros-
ecution withheld several pieces of evidence, however, that showed 
that the man who originally blamed Kyles, Joseph Wallace, might 
have been the perpetrator.59 The prosecutor was unaware of this 
evidence until after trial, even though it was in police custody.60 
The Court held that the “the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”61 
In examining materiality, the Court recognized two sorts of 
prosecutorial duties: the Court concluded that “the rule [of mate-
riality] in Bagley (and, hence, in Brady) requires less of the pros-
ecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.”62 In other 
words, the American Bar Association (ABA) requires disclosure of 
 
 51 Agurs, 427 US at 112 (finding that evidence is material “if the omitted evidence 
creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist”). 
 52 Id at 107 (“[I]f the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it 
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no 
request is made.”). 
 53 Id at 110. 
 54 Id at 111 (quotation marks omitted). 
 55 295 US 78 (1935). 
 56 Id at 88. 
 57 Agurs, 427 US at 111. 
 58 Kyles, 514 US at 423. 
 59 Id at 428–29. 
 60 Id at 438. 
 61 Id at 437. 
 62 Kyles, 514 US at 437 
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any evidence that tends to exculpate, whereas Brady requires dis-
closure only of material evidence.63 In short, Kyles did away with 
any requirement that a defendant prove the individual prosecu-
tor’s knowledge of the exculpatory evidence, while also recogniz-
ing the difference between constitutionally imposed prosecutorial 
duties and ABA-imposed prosecutorial duties. 
Agurs’s and Kyles’s discussions of prosecutorial duties inform 
this Comment’s discussion of duty in the constructive fraud con-
text. Kyles’s lack of a scienter requirement also shows that a con-
structive fraud remedy is suitable. To see why a contract law rem-
edy is superior to a constitutional remedy in the first place, 
however, one must first observe the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism. 
2. The premises of the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism. 
To understand the obstacle that due process arguments for 
pre-plea disclosure face, one must understand the premises of 
what this Comment refers to as the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism. Each 
case presents a premise. First, this Section explains Bagley’s con-
clusion that exculpatory and impeachment evidence are not con-
stitutionally distinct. Second, this Section describes Ruiz’s hold-
ing that pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence is not 
constitutionally required. 
Bagley considered the relationship between impeachment 
and exculpatory evidence. The government indicted Hughes  
Bagley for fifteen firearm and narcotics offenses.64 While the law 
enforcement officers testifying against Bagley at trial said that 
they had not received any reward for their testimony, Bagley later 
found evidence that the government had paid each officer $300.65 
Before Bagley reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit 
had “treated impeachment evidence as constitutionally different 
from exculpatory evidence,” finding that withholding impeach-
ment evidence was more egregious.66 The Supreme Court held 
that it had previously “rejected any such distinction between im-
peachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”67 In order to ap-
ply the materiality standard of Agurs and resolve the dispute in 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Bagley, 473 US at 669. 
 65 Id at 670–71. 
 66 Id at 676. 
 67 Id. 
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Bagley, the Court necessarily had to show that impeachment ev-
idence falls under the rules of Brady and its progeny.68 Four Jus-
tices have described this statement as a “significant develop-
ment[ ]” of the Court’s Brady jurisprudence.69 
The Court also crafted a materiality standard, finding that a 
piece of evidence is material for Brady purposes “only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.”70 A reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”71 
In 2002, the Court decided Ruiz.72 Immigration authorities 
found marijuana in Angela Ruiz’s luggage, and the US Attorney’s 
Office offered Ruiz a plea agreement.73 The agreement stated that 
the government had turned over “any known information estab-
lishing the factual innocence of the defendant” and that Ruiz 
waived her right to receive “impeachment information . . . as well 
as the right to receive information supporting any affirmative  
defense.”74 
Although criminal defendants have wide latitude in waiving 
constitutional and statutory protections in exchange for favorable 
plea deals,75 the Ninth Circuit had held that “a defendant’s right 
to receive undisclosed Brady material cannot be waived through 
a plea agreement.”76 A defendant’s ignorance of a piece of im-
peachment evidence in the government’s files, the argument goes, 
precludes a defendant from making a plea “voluntarily and intel-
ligently to satisfy due process requirements.”77 However, a unan-
imous Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “the Constitution 
does not require the Government to disclose material impeach-
ment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”78 The language surrounding this holding, however, 
furnished the fodder for the circuit split. 
 
 68 Bagley, 473 US at 676–82. 
 69 Connick v Thompson, 563 US 51, 99 n 16 (2011) (Ginsburg dissenting), citing  
Bagley, 473 US at 676. 
 70 Bagley, 473 US at 682. 
 71 Id. This materiality standard manifests in this Comment’s discussion of the mate-
riality standard applicable to a constructive fraud claim in Part III. 
 72 536 US 622. 
 73 Id at 625. 
 74 Id (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
 75 See United States v Mezzanatto, 513 US 196, 210 (1995). 
 76 United States v Ruiz, 241 F3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir 2001), revd, 536 US 622 (2002). 
 77 Id at 1164. 
 78 Ruiz, 536 US at 633. 
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Much of the Court’s reasoning applied explicitly to both im-
peachment and exculpatory evidence. Like Brady, the Court’s un-
derlying rationale was that impeachment evidence “is special in 
relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea 
is voluntary.”79 The Court concluded that waivers in plea agree-
ments are generally voluntary, so long as a defendant under-
stands “the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in 
general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may 
not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”80 Sig-
nificantly, the Court characterized both rights to exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence as “trial-related rights.”81 Finally, mirror-
ing Bagley, the Court concluded that it was “difficult to distin-
guish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of 
grounds for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible fu-
ture trial from (2) the varying forms of ignorance at issue” in 
other cases in which the defendant “misapprehended the quality 
of the State’s case.”82 
On the other hand, the Court in a solitary sentence singled 
out impeachment evidence. The Court found that it was “particu-
larly difficult to characterize impeachment information as critical 
information” due to “the random way in which such information 
may, or may not, help a particular defendant.”83 
Justice Clarence Thomas objected to this supposedly “flawed 
characterization about the usefulness of certain types of infor-
mation” in his concurrence.84 Justice Thomas also highlighted the 
majority’s conclusion that due process does not require pre-plea 
disclosure of impeachment evidence or affirmative defense infor-
mation.85 As the majority agreed, Brady was concerned with en-
suring a fair trial and, according to Justice Thomas, the plea 
agreement stage does not implicate concerns about a fair trial re-
gardless of the type of evidence withheld.86 
 
 79 Id at 629 (emphases in original). 
 80 Id (emphases in original). 
 81 Id at 631. 
 82 Ruiz, 536 US at 631. 
 83 Id at 630. 
 84 Id at 634 (Thomas concurring). 
 85 Id at 633. 
 86 Ruiz, 536 US at 634. 
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C. The Problem Presented by the Bagley/Ruiz Syllogism 
Given this background, what is the problem facing due pro-
cess arguments for pre-plea disclosure? The problem is the  
Bagley/Ruiz syllogism: Bagley held that there was no constitu-
tional distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evi-
dence. Ruiz held that there was no constitutional requirement to 
disclose impeachment evidence pre-plea. If the Court relies on ru-
dimentary rules of logic,87 it necessarily follows that pre-plea dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence is not constitutionally required.88 
Several courts have already recognized this syllogism.89  
The point of this Section is not that due process arguments 
for pre-plea disclosure are impossible or unsound. Instead, this 
 
 87 See, for example, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Broudo, 544 US 336, 342 (2005) 
(“[A]s a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has 
suffered no loss.”); Shapiro v United States, 335 US 1, 25 (1948) (“[S]urely logic as well as 
history requires a similar reading of the proviso.”). Justices often critique one another 
when they believe their colleagues have used flawed logic. See, for example, New York v 
Harris, 495 US 14, 21 (1990) (Marshall dissenting) (“The majority’s conclusion . . . 
amounts to nothing more than an analytical sleight of hand, resting on errors in logic.”); 
Atkins v Parker, 472 US 115, 136 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (asking whether an “impli-
cation is logically required”). 
 88 Lest the reader overlook the logical necessity of this conclusion, a brief formal logic 
analysis is warranted: Figure 1 shows the logical necessity of the conclusion that pre-plea 
disclosure is not constitutionally required. “E” stands for the proposition that pre-plea ex-
culpatory evidence disclosure is constitutionally required. “I” stands for the proposition 
that pre-plea impeachment evidence disclosure is constitutionally required. The tilde sym-
bol, “~,” negates any premise that it precedes. Symbolic Logic { Philosophy Index },  
(Philosophy–Index.com, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/A88Y-F4RU. The “” symbol 
expresses a biconditional, also described as “equivalence.” Id. This means that each prop-
osition is necessary and sufficient to prove the other. Id. The “∴ ” symbol signals a conclu-
sion. Id. The proof is explicated below, but it appears as follows: 
FIGURE 1 
I  E 
~ I 
∴ ~ E 
“~I” expresses Ruiz’s holding that pre-plea impeachment evidence disclosure is not consti-
tutionally required. The biconditional, “,” expresses that two propositions are equivalent, 
and this appropriately expresses Bagley’s conclusion that there is no constitutional dis-
tinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence (in other words, that they are 
constitutionally equivalent). Id. Thus, given the biconditional’s expression of equivalence, 
if one proposition in the biconditional is false (~I), then the other proposition must of ne-
cessity be false (~E). 
 Thus, the syllogism of Figure 1 is valid, which means that if the premises are true, the 
conclusion necessarily follows. Any judge or scholar who believes that Supreme Court 
precedent means what it says must also affirm that, according to the Supreme Court in 
Bagley (I  E) and Ruiz (~I), each premise is true. 
 89 See, for example, Friedman v Rehal, 618 F3d 142, 154 (2d Cir 2010); Clark v Lewis, 
2014 WL 1665224, *8 (ED Cal). 
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Section shows the obstacle that the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism creates 
in order to best frame the main theoretical responses to the  
syllogism. 
II.  THE CIRCUITS’ RESPONSES TO THE BAGLEY/RUIZ SYLLOGISM 
Given the Court’s reluctance to extend its holding in Ruiz be-
yond impeachment evidence, lower courts have diverged in their 
interpretations. On the one hand, some courts hold that Ruiz in-
stead created a distinction between impeachment and exculpa-
tory evidence. Under this interpretation, pre-plea disclosure is 
constitutionally required, because exculpatory evidence, unlike 
impeachment evidence, is critical information. On the other hand, 
some courts hold that Ruiz was applying the general rule that 
there is no constitutional right to receive Brady evidence pre-plea. 
Under this interpretation, a criminal defendant only triggers 
Brady obligations by actually proceeding to trial. 
A. Some Circuits Appear to Hold That Due Process Requires 
Pre-plea Exculpatory Evidence Disclosure 
There are a few ways for courts to conclude that pre-plea dis-
closure is constitutionally required, all of which involve denying 
the truth of the Bagley premise. This Section first analyzes how a 
court can require pre-plea disclosure on largely procedural 
grounds. With this approach, a court can hint at a distinction be-
tween exculpatory and impeachment evidence, letting lower 
courts draw the inference that the two are in fact distinct. This is 
the Second Circuit’s approach. Second, a court can distinguish ex-
culpatory and impeachment evidence by largely ignoring Bagley. 
This is the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Third, a court can explicitly 
argue that Ruiz distinguished between exculpatory and impeach-
ment evidence. This is the Seventh and Tenth Circuits’ approach. 
1. Courts can distinguish exculpatory evidence from 
impeachment evidence based on procedural 
considerations. 
If a court relies on procedural technicalities, that court can 
allow lower courts to conclude that pre-plea disclosure is consti-
tutionally required without immediately or explicitly distinguish-
ing exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Habeas corpus re-
view provides a salient example. Under 28 USC § 2254, the 
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question a federal court must ask on post-conviction habeas cor-
pus review is whether the state court’s determination was an “un-
reasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent.90 Thus, 
faced with a habeas case, a federal circuit court can simply con-
clude that a lower court’s interpretation of Ruiz is not unreason-
able but simultaneously provide commentary on Ruiz, such that 
lower courts can later fill in the blanks and conclude that Ruiz 
requires pre-plea disclosure. 
The Second Circuit took this tack in Friedman v Rehal.91 A 
state court had said that due process does not require pre-plea 
disclosure.92 In response to a subsequent petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus, the Second Circuit asked whether the lower court’s 
conclusion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 
precedent.93 The court noted Bagley’s identical treatment of im-
peachment and exculpatory evidence and concluded that the state 
court’s holding was not an unreasonable interpretation of Su-
preme Court precedent.94 The court noted, however, that Ruiz did 
not overrule past circuit precedent that required pre-plea disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence.95 
While this approach did not immediately mandate pre-plea 
disclosure,96 Second Circuit district courts relied on Friedman to 
distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence 
without using the “unreasonable application” test required in ha-
beas review.97 In terms of the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism, this is the 
equivalent of denying Bagley’s conclusion that there is no  
constitutional distinction between exculpatory and impeachment  
evidence. 
 
 90 28 USC § 2254(d)(1). 
 91 618 F3d 142 (2d Cir 2010). 
 92 Id at 154. 
 93 Id at 152–53. 
 94 Id at 154 (“It is enough to say that the holding of the Nassau County Court . . . 
does not constitute an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court precedent as 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) requires.”). 
 95 Friedman, 618 F3d at 154 (“Petitioner is correct that Ruiz did not expressly abro-
gate this holding as applied to all Brady material.”). 
 96 The Fifth Circuit has even characterized the Second Circuit as “seem[ing] to have 
doubts about a defendant’s constitutional entitlement to exculpatory Brady material be-
fore entering a guilty plea.” Alvarez, 904 F3d at 392. 
 97 See, for example, Davis v United States, 2015 WL 1277011, *5 (D Conn) (“[T]he 
Brady rule applies in the plea-bargaining context only to exculpatory evidence, but not to 
impeachment evidence.”). 
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2. Courts can ignore Bagley. 
While the habeas approach allows a circuit court to address 
the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism, the second approach is for the court to 
simply ignore the syllogism. With this approach, courts need not 
grapple with the tough question of whether there is a distinction 
between exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Courts imply 
such a distinction by allowing a litigant to bring a claim based on 
an assumed constitutional right to receive exculpatory evidence 
pre-plea. 
The Ninth Circuit uses this approach. Before Ruiz, the Ninth 
Circuit in Sanchez v United States98 held that pre-plea disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence is constitutionally required because 
waiver of Brady rights can never be intelligent or voluntary.99 Af-
ter Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the issue in Smith v 
Baldwin.100 The court held that a pre-plea disclosure claim failed 
on Sanchez’s materiality standard.101 This citation to Sanchez and 
the analysis of a pre-plea Brady violation suggest that Ruiz did 
not overrule or abrogate Sanchez’s holding that the Constitution 
requires pre-plea disclosure.102 Bagley’s conclusion that there is 
no constitutional distinction between exculpatory and impeach-
ment evidence made no appearance in the opinion.103 Ninth Cir-
cuit district courts explicitly note that Ruiz limited its holding to 
impeachment evidence.104 Thus, the Ninth Circuit considers pre-
plea disclosure claims without explicitly distinguishing impeach-
ment and exculpatory evidence. In short, the Ninth Circuit essen-
tially ignores the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism altogether. 
  
 
 98 50 F3d 1448 (9th Cir 1995). 
 99 See id at 1453 (“We therefore hold that a defendant challenging the voluntariness 
of a guilty plea may assert a Brady claim.”). 
 100 510 F3d 1127 (9th Cir 2007) (en banc). 
 101 Id at 1148 (citing Sanchez to define materiality as “whether there is a reasonable 
probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant would 
have refused to plead”). 
 102 Id at 1147–48. 
 103 See id at 1148 (citing only Sanchez). 
 104 See, for example, Wright v Director of Corrections (CA), 2013 WL 6388380, *9 (CD 
Cal). But see Clark, 2014 WL 1665224 at *8 (finding that exculpatory evidence is treated 
the same as impeachment evidence under Ruiz, per Bagley, and thus pre-plea disclosure 
is not constitutionally required). 
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3. Courts can explicitly distinguish exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence. 
While the first two options skirted the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism, 
a court could reject the conclusion of the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism by 
explicitly distinguishing exculpatory and impeachment evidence. 
First, courts can assert that Bagley used crude language to con-
nect exculpatory and impeachment evidence. In another part of 
Bagley, however, the Court said impeachment evidence “falls 
within th[e] general rule [of Brady].”105 Thus, if a piece of evidence 
is impeachment evidence, then all rules applicable to Brady evi-
dence govern it. It does not follow, however, that if something is 
Brady evidence, then all rules applicable to impeachment evi-
dence govern it.106 As of this writing, no court has decided to pick 
and choose Bagley’s language in this way. Second, those seeking 
to make such an argument can further posit that Ruiz’s conclu-
sion—that it is “particularly difficult to characterize impeach-
ment information as critical information”107—implies that it is not 
as difficult to characterize exculpatory evidence as critical infor-
mation. A court could conclude that exculpatory evidence is in-
deed critical information. 
For instance, in McCann v Mangialardi,108 the Seventh Cir-
cuit interpreted Ruiz as creating a “significant distinction be-
tween impeachment information and exculpatory evidence.”109 
Thus, because the Court hinted in Ruiz that impeachment evi-
dence is particularly irrelevant pre-plea, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that it was “highly likely that the Supreme Court would 
find a violation of the Due Process Clause” if prosecutors sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence pre-plea.110 Significantly, however, 
none of the courts in the Seventh Circuit after McCann acknowl-
edged Bagley when distinguishing exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence. 
 
 105 Bagley, 473 US at 677, quoting Giglio, 405 US at 154. 
 106 As a matter of formal logic, this interpretation of Bagley posits a conditional 
(if/then statement), and to describe Brady as being governed by all rules applicable to 
impeachment evidence is to fallaciously affirm the consequent. Affirming the  
Consequent Fallacy { Philosophy Index }, (Philosophy–Index.com, 2019), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FWC7-TYA5. To be clear, this argument breaks down if Bagley posits a 
biconditional, as indicated in Part I, as opposed to only a single conditional. 
 107 Ruiz, 536 US at 630. 
 108 337 F3d 782 (7th Cir 2003). 
 109 Id at 788. 
 110 Id. 
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In the same way, the Tenth Circuit claimed in United States 
v Ohiri111 that Ruiz indicated that “impeachment evidence differs 
from exculpatory evidence” because it is not critical information 
of which a defendant must be aware before he pleads guilty.112 
Both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits assumed that exculpatory 
evidence was critical information without further explanation.113 
In terms of the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism, both courts can be under-
stood as holding that Ruiz clarifies or overrules Bagley. 
In sum, the Second Circuit required pre-plea disclosure by 
addressing the issue on a habeas corpus case and allowing lower 
courts to fill in the gaps. The Ninth Circuit meanwhile provides 
an example of a court ignoring Bagley’s distinction between im-
peachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. Finally, the Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits focus on Ruiz’s statement that it is “par-
ticularly difficult to characterize impeachment information as 
critical information,”114 arguing that exculpatory evidence is dis-
tinguishable from impeachment evidence in that exculpatory ev-
idence is in fact critical information. 
B. Some Courts Hold That Due Process Does Not Require Pre-
plea Disclosure 
While courts that require pre-plea disclosure zero in on Ruiz’s 
“particularly difficult”115 language, courts that do not require pre-
plea disclosure focus on other language in Ruiz. These courts fo-
cus on Ruiz’s characterization of the rights to both exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence as “trial-related rights.”116 Given 
these circuits’ consistent reasoning, this Comment examines each 
circuit briefly, pausing on the Fifth Circuit, which provides the 
most recent decision and most fleshed out arguments concerning 
pre-plea disclosure. 
 
 111 133 Fed Appx 555 (10th Cir 2005). 
 112 Id at 562. 
 113 Id, quoting Ruiz, 536 US at 629 (“[Ruiz] explained that impeachment evidence 
differs from exculpatory evidence in that it is not ‘critical information.’”); McCann, 337 
F3d at 787–88, quoting Ruiz, 536 US at 630 (arguing that because “Ruiz reasoned that it 
was ‘particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information as critical infor-
mation,’ . . . Ruiz indicates a significant distinction between impeachment information 
and exculpatory evidence”) (emphasis in original). 
 114 Ruiz, 536 US at 630. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id at 631. 
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In United States v Mathur,117 the First Circuit classified 
Brady as a trial right, concluding that, under Ruiz, there is no 
constitutional obligation for a prosecutor “to share all useful in-
formation with the defendant.”118 Similarly in United States v 
Moussaoui,119 the Fourth Circuit held that Brady preserves the 
fairness of a trial, and in a plea bargain, Brady “concerns are al-
most completely eliminated because [ ] guilt is admitted.”120 
In September of 2018, the Fifth Circuit decided Alvarez v City 
of Brownsville,121 which involved the story of George Alvarez dis-
cussed in the Introduction. Sitting en banc, the court refused to 
extend Brady to the pre-plea context.122 In justifying its conclu-
sion, the Fifth Circuit noted that Brady sought to preserve the 
fairness of the trial.123 The court, however, fractured into several 
concurrences and dissents. These present some of the best argu-
ments on every side of the issue, making them worthy of review. 
Judge James C. Ho’s concurrence vigorously defended the 
court’s holding. Judge Ho catalogued the Court’s cases that char-
acterized Brady as a trial right, citing Justice Thomas’s assertion 
in Ruiz that the plea stage never implicates this right.124 Judge 
Ho characterized other courts that have extended Brady to the 
pre-plea context as “flirting with . . . a novel alteration of the con-
stitutional doctrine.”125 Furthermore, a defendant may waive var-
ious rights,126 and, the argument goes, there is no principled dis-
tinction between these rights and Brady rights.127 Finally, 
extending Brady diminishes its value to defendants, thereby “im-
prison[ing] a man in his privileges and call[ing] it the Constitu-
tion.”128 In other words, a defendant’s ability to waive his right to 
 
 117 624 F3d 498 (1st Cir 2010). 
 118 Id at 507, quoting Ruiz, 536 US at 629. 
 119 591 F3d 263 (4th Cir 2010). 
 120 Id at 285. See also United States v Brown, 576 Fed Appx 145, 148 (4th Cir 2014) 
(concluding that a defendant could not assert a Brady violation because no trial had  
occurred). 
 121 904 F3d 382 (5th Cir 2018). 
 122 Id at 394. 
 123 Id at 392–93. 
 124 Id at 399 (Ho concurring), citing Ruiz, 536 US at 628 (Thomas concurring). 
 125 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 397. 
 126 Id at 399–400 (describing the right to a trial, the right to a bench trial, the right 
to confront accusers, and the right to compulsory process for favorable witnesses). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id at 401 (emphasis omitted), quoting Adams v United States, 317 US 269,  
280 (1942). 
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exculpatory evidence is a “significant bargaining chip in plea ne-
gotiations” and removing that right decreases a defendant’s lev-
erage in getting the prosecutor to reduce his sentence.129 
Judge Gregg Costa dissented, arguing that Brady concerned 
justice in general, more than fairness at trial.130 Moreover, a pros-
ecutor providing a factual basis for a guilty plea in open court, 
who does not explain the presence of exculpatory evidence, vio-
lates a prosecutor’s duty to tell the truth.131 Judge Costa was also 
perplexed by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) opposition to ex-
tension of Brady, as the DOJ’s own policy requires that prosecu-
tors turn over exculpatory evidence “reasonably promptly after it 
is discovered.”132 
C. This Comment’s Rejection of Due Process Arguments for 
Pre-plea Disclosure Is Justified 
This Comment argues that proponents of pre-plea disclosure 
should use contract law arguments in lieu of constitutional argu-
ments. Why should proponents of pre-plea disclosure jettison due 
process arguments for pre-plea disclosure when they have pre-
vailed in about half the circuits that have addressed the issue? 
Here is why: Due process arguments that actually grapple with 
the syllogism typically contend that Ruiz acknowledges a consti-
tutional distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evi-
dence. This implies, however, that Ruiz overruled Bagley’s pre-
sumably precedential holding that there is no distinction between 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. This implication is prob-
lematic for several reasons. 
First, that interpretation is tenuous because while Ruiz did 
indicate that it is “particularly difficult” to characterize impeach-
ment evidence as critical information, that language does not  
intimate that exculpatory evidence should be characterized as 
 
 129 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401. Here, Judge Ho’s illustration is useful. According to leg-
end, King Siam gave political rivals “sacred white elephants.” Id. One could not sell or 
work these elephants (because they were sacred, of course). Id. Eventually the elephants 
would drive their owners into bankruptcy, given their appetite. Id. Similarly, to give a 
defendant a non-waivable right to receive exculpatory evidence is to remove the utility of 
that right from a defendant, namely his ability to waive that right in exchange for a re-
duced sentence. Id. Thus, removing a defendant’s ability to waive his right decreases a 
prosecutor’s incentive to reduce a defendant’s sentence through bargaining. Id. 
 130 Id at 407 (Costa dissenting). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id at 410, quoting United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-5.001(D)(1), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S9EY-BKDF. 
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critical information. Even if one concedes that the Supreme Court 
distinguished exculpatory and impeachment evidence, nothing in 
the text of Ruiz suggests that this is a constitutionally relevant 
distinction that could overrule Bagley. Moreover, the “particu-
larly difficult” language comprised a single sentence in Ruiz, 
whereas the Court spent the surrounding paragraphs describing 
the rights to exculpatory and impeachment evidence as “trial- 
related rights” and finding that “impeachment information is spe-
cial in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether 
a plea is voluntary.”133 If rights that affect the fairness of a trial 
do not affect the voluntariness of a plea, then a defendant by 
pleading guilty has forgone a fair trial’s “accompanying constitu-
tional guarantees,” including other “trial-related” rights like the 
right to receive exculpatory evidence.134  
Second, the trouble with using the Court’s “particularly diffi-
cult” language to show a constitutionally relevant distinction  
between exculpatory and impeachment evidence is further  
demonstrated by the fact that both circuits that described excul-
patory evidence as critical information provided no reasoning for 
that designation.135 While these courts claim that exculpatory ev-
idence is critical information, which is so important that a defend-
ant must be aware of it before pleading guilty, Ruiz concluded 
that a defendant’s ignorance from a lack of impeachment evidence 
was “difficult to distinguish, in terms of importance” from the ig-
norance he experiences when he “misapprehend[s] the quality of 
the State’s case.”136 Exculpatory evidence, if it is important at the 
plea stage, is important because it helps the defendant evaluate 
the quality of the government’s case.137 Thus, if anything, Ruiz 
supports the conclusion that exculpatory evidence, like impeach-
ment evidence, is not critical information. 
Finally, if Ruiz had overruled Bagley, one would expect the 
justices who overruled Bagley to cease treating Bagley with the 
importance it had before they overruled it. The opposite is true. 
Nine years after Ruiz, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who joined 
Ruiz), Justice Stephen Breyer (who wrote Ruiz), Justice Sonia  
 
 133 Ruiz, 536 US at 629 (emphases in original). 
 134 Id at 628–29, 631. 
 135 See Ohiri, 133 Fed Appx at 562; McCann, 337 F3d at 787–88. 
 136 Ruiz, 536 US at 630–31, quoting Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 757 (1970). 
 137 Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 Yale L J 
1909, 1937 (1992) (“Based on the different packages of information each side has, both 
must generate an estimate of the likelihood that [the defendant] will be convicted if the 
case goes to trial.”). 
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Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan characterized Bagley’s hold-
ing that there is no constitutional distinction between impeach-
ment and exculpatory evidence as a “significant development[ ]” 
in the Court’s Brady jurisprudence.138 It is hard to believe that 
Ruiz, without explicitly mentioning it, somehow overruled  
Bagley. It is even harder to believe that, after this surreptitious 
nullification of Bagley, the very justices who supposedly crafted 
this nullification would then venerate Bagley as a “significant de-
velopment[ ]” in Brady jurisprudence.139 
This is not to say that due process arguments for pre-plea 
disclosure are indubitably unsound; the simple point of this  
analysis is to show that arguments refuting the Bagley/Ruiz syl-
logism face an uphill battle. Thus, those wishing to provide de-
fendants with a way to receive exculpatory evidence pre-plea, who 
do not wish to rely on a strained interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent, should seek a new framework to resolve the circuit 
split. This Comment proposes that contract law principles and 
constructive fraud provide that framework. 
III.  CONTRACT LAW, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD, BIG BOY CLAUSES, 
AND COLLOQUIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRE-PLEA DISCLOSURE 
Scholars have expended vast amounts of resources arguing 
that pre-plea disclosure is a due process right.140 Several circuits, 
however, consistently reject due process arguments, and given 
the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism, there is a significant possibility that 
the Supreme Court might reject them too. Even if the Court con-
tinues to deny certiorari on pre-plea disclosure cases, more crim-
inal defendants who seek relief from guilty pleas that occurred 
without pre-plea disclosures stand to benefit from alternative ar-
guments in those jurisdictions that reject due process arguments. 
This Comment provides one of these alternative arguments that 
is free from the risk of “flirting with . . . a novel alteration of the 
constitutional doctrine.”141 Defendants can use contract law prin-
ciples and the doctrine of constructive fraud. 
  
 
 138 Connick, 563 US at 99 n 16 (2011) (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See, for example, Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2083 (cited in note 10). 
 141 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 397 (Ho concurring). 
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A. Contract Law, with Important Limitations, Is an 
Appropriate Remedy 
Beyond the strained interpretation of Ruiz, this Section ex-
amines reasons that litigants should prefer to use contract law 
arguments over due process arguments for pre-plea disclosure. 
First, if the issue of pre-plea disclosure makes it to the Supreme 
Court, there is reason to think that contract law arguments would 
have a higher likelihood of prevailing. Second, contract law is bet-
ter tailored to the pre-plea exculpatory evidence context than the 
due process clause. 
1. Judges who reject due process arguments might be more 
disposed to rule for defendants on contract law grounds. 
Even if judges agree that pre-plea disclosure is a good idea, 
they may balk at the notion of creating a new constitutional right. 
Many judges hesitate to create constitutional rights that they 
cannot find in the text of the Constitution or in precedent. Thus, 
judges often shy away from policy outcomes they desire based on 
trepidation about inventing new rights.142 Several Supreme Court 
justices, including Justice Neil Gorsuch,143 Justice Brett  
Kavanaugh,144 and Chief Justice John Roberts145 seem to agree 
 
 142 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave 
Maria L Rev 19, 21–22 (2003) (arguing that even if “Lochner expressed desirable . . . social 
policy” it was still “an abomination” because “[t]he Court invented a right to make con-
tracts, a right found nowhere in the Constitution”). 
 143 Justice Gorsuch expressed his belief that “[i]t is the job of the judge to apply it, not 
amend the law . . . even when he might well prefer a very different outcome.” Bruce 
Schreiner, Supreme Court’s Gorsuch Touts Conservative Role for Judges (Associated Press, 
Sept 21, 2017) (ellipsis in original), archived at http://perma.cc/27J8-GJLN. 
 144 Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 Cath U L Rev 683, 
687 (2016) (“[T]o be a good judge . . . you have to understand your proper role in the game: 
to apply the rules and not to re-make the rules based on your own policy views.”). 
 145 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Jus-
tice of the United States, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109 Cong, 1st Sess 55 (2005) 
(explaining that his mentor, Justice William Rehnquist, taught him that “[j]udges have to 
have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent,” which 
means that “a certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges and Justices 
are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t 
make the rules, they apply them.”). See also Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2616 
(2015) (Roberts dissenting): 
[T]he majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the 
unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discredited 
decisions such as Lochner v. New York. . . . If I were a legislator, I would certainly 
consider that view as a matter of social policy. But as a judge, I find the major-
ity’s position indefensible as a matter of constitutional law. 
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with this interpretative philosophy. Because lower court judges 
who deny any due process right to pre-plea disclosure are con-
cerned that creating such a right would constitute “a novel alter-
ation of the constitutional doctrine,”146 the notion of extending 
Brady might also give many Supreme Court justices pause. 
The justices might be sympathetic to the problem of inno-
cents pleading guilty, and the Court in Ruiz even acknowledged 
that concern.147 There is good reason, however, to believe that the 
Court will be disposed to deal with this concern on contract law 
grounds instead of directly on due process grounds. For instance, 
Justice Thomas, who would most certainly find no right to pre-
plea disclosure,148 wrote that the solution to any problems created 
by criminal defendants giving up rights in plea agreements was 
not constitutional extensions prohibiting waiver of rights.149 In-
stead the “appropriate response” is to “permit case-by-case inquir-
ies into whether waiver agreements are the product of fraud or 
coercion.”150 
2. Contract law is better tailored to the pre-plea 
exculpatory evidence context. 
Beyond the problems created by a strained interpretation of 
precedent, the Constitution simply does not fit the situation of 
pre-plea disclosure. The Constitution requires that a “defendant 
enter a guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and make related waivers 
‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of 
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’”151 However, 
the Court has interpreted the “relevant circumstances” language 
to mean that a defendant must understand only “the nature of 
the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circum-
stances—even though the defendant may not know the specific 
detailed consequences of invoking it.”152 Thus, the Due Process 
Clauses do not require a defendant to be aware of the specific con-
sequences of waiving a right. A defendant’s prospective 
knowledge about a specific piece of exculpatory evidence sounds 
 
 146 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 397 (Ho concurring). 
 147 Ruiz, 536 US at 631 (“That fact, along with other guilty-plea safeguards . . . dimin-
ishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of impeachment information, innocent 
individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”). 
 148 See id at 634 (Thomas concurring). 
 149 United States v Mezzanatto, 513 US 196, 210 (1995). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Ruiz, 536 US at 629, quoting Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 242 (1969). 
 152 Ruiz, 536 US at 629 (emphasis in original). 
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like a “specific detailed consequence” as opposed to a general un-
derstanding of the “nature of the right.” In other words, the 
square peg of constitutionally mandated pre-plea disclosure does 
not fit the round hole of the Due Process Clause. 
Contract law, on the other hand, is well-suited to the excul-
patory evidence context. The exigency of this Comment is inno-
cent people pleading guilty. To help these defendants get out of 
prison or avoid prison in the first place, the ideal remedy is re-
scission of the plea agreement and reversal of the guilty plea. A 
contract law doctrine that makes the plea agreement unenforce-
able and rescindable would be apt and would avoid the  
Bagley/Ruiz syllogism.153 Thus, because “plea bargains are essen-
tially contracts,”154 it is fitting to first seek to resolve any per-
ceived injustice in the plea-bargaining process by sifting through 
the vast body of contract doctrines to find the doctrine best tai-
lored to the pre-plea, exculpatory evidence context. 
3. Limitations on any plausible contract law doctrine. 
Contract law is generally more suitable to the pre-plea dis-
closure context than are the Due Process Clauses. However, it is 
imperative to find the right sort of contract doctrine. For example, 
some contract law arguments for pre-plea exculpatory evidence 
disclosure already face resistance from the Supreme Court. Ruiz 
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which had directly relied 
on commentators who concluded that contract principles like “ad-
hesion, duress, mistake, [and] unconscionability” required pre-
plea disclosure.155 The fact that the Court did not adopt these con-
tract doctrines suggests that a defendant must carefully separate 
out those contract law doctrines that are doomed from the get-go 
from those that a court could plausibly utilize in this context. 
Thus, this Section describes three qualities of a plausible contract 
doctrine that could require pre-plea disclosure. First, the contract 
law doctrine should not blend with constitutional law precedent. 
Second, the contract law doctrine should not provide a remedy 
 
 153 Contract law also avoids prosecutorial immunity issues that arise in tort claims, 
as contract law does not require the defendant to file an entirely new tort action. For a 
discussion of prosecutorial immunity with respect to tort law, see Margaret Z. Johns, Re-
considering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L Rev 53, 54. 
 154 Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 137 (2009). 
 155 Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2074 (cited in note 10). See Ruiz, 241 F3d at 1164 
n 3, citing Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2085 (cited in note 10); and Erica G. Franklin, 
Comment, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the 
Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 Stan L Rev 567, 581 (1999). 
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that is coextensive with a constitutional law remedy. Third, the 
contract law doctrine must fit the typical pre-plea exculpatory ev-
idence situation. 
a) An apt contract doctrine should not blend completely with 
Brady.  One primary reason to shift to contract law arguments is 
to avoid the limitations of the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism. Neverthe-
less, some commentators blend contract doctrines and due pro-
cess in their arguments.156 For instance, Daniel Blank provides an 
example of the sort of flawed contract law argument that this 
Comment seeks to avoid. Blank argues that contract doctrines 
like adhesion, duress, and unconscionability “suggest that, even 
if the practice of plea bargaining as a whole can pass constitu-
tional muster under contract analysis, waivers of the right to dis-
closure of Brady material cannot.”157 Blank’s arguments use con-
tract doctrines to suggest a constitutional conclusion that Brady 
applies pre-plea. If a court doubts that there is a constitutional 
requirement for pre-plea disclosure, it is also unlikely to buy into 
an argument that uses contract law as a means of suggesting pre-
cisely the same constitutional conclusion. 
b) An apt contract doctrine should not provide a remedy that 
is coextensive with a constitutional law remedy.  A coextensive so-
lution is one that requires “essentially the same practical conse-
quences as a holding that [pre-plea disclosure] is constitutionally 
required.”158 For instance, Blank proposed that under various con-
tract doctrines, waivers of Brady rights could never be enforcea-
ble.159 A rule that is not coextensive, in this context, would mean 
that some waivers of Brady rights are enforceable. 
There are ample reasons to think that the coextensive char-
acteristic could act as a bane for contract arguments that are used 
in lieu of due process arguments. Martinez v Ryan160 provides an 
example. In that case, every justice shied away from implement-
ing an equitable remedy that was coextensive with a constitu-
tional remedy. The Court confronted “a question of constitutional 
law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in  
collateral proceedings,” but claimed that “[t]his is not the case, 
 
 156 Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2074 (cited in note 10). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Martinez v Ryan, 566 US 1, 20 (2012) (Scalia dissenting). 
 159 Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2085 (cited in note 10). Blank also argues that “under 
a contract-based approach, a defendant may not waive his Brady rights as part of a plea 
bargain.” Id at 2074. 
 160 566 US 1 (2012). 
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however, to resolve . . . a constitutional matter.”161 Thus, the 
Court instead implemented an equitable remedy.162 The charge of 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent was that, by claiming to avoid a 
constitutional rule but instead implementing a coextensive equi-
table regime, the Court committed intellectual dishonesty.163 In-
stead of being forthcoming in divulging the “radical step” in its 
constitutional jurisprudence, the Court, according to Justice 
Scalia, disguised its dubious constitutional interpretation behind 
the veneer of an equitable remedy.164 Lest the reader dismiss Jus-
tice Scalia’s criticism as the opinions of a single justice, the ma-
jority did not fight the charge that a coextensive remedy in lieu of 
a tenuous constitutional conclusion would be suspect. Instead, the 
majority argued that there were “differences between a constitu-
tional ruling and the equitable ruling of this case.”165 
Thus, under Martinez, coextensive rules are not inherently 
suspect.166 They become suspect only when the proposed constitu-
tional rule, to which the alternative remedy is coextensive, relies 
on a strained interpretation of the Constitution or precedent.167 
The concern is that use of the coextensive rule is “a sham,” when 
it is not an honest application of precedent, but instead a guise 
under which to create new constitutional rights.168 Martinez’s co-
extensive concern is relevant to this Comment in two ways. First, 
because this Comment seeks to replace a tenuous due process con-
clusion with a contract doctrine, this Comment must be careful to 
show real differences between the effects of the two arguments. A 
coextensive rule with precisely the same effect as a due process 
rule would likely not hoodwink judges who are concerned that a 
constitutional rule “imprison[s] a man in his privileges and call[s] 
it the Constitution.”169 Second, Part III.D rejects another strained 
interpretation of circuit court precedent concerning big boy 
 
 161 Id at 8, 9. 
 162 Id at 16. 
 163 Id at 21 (Scalia dissenting). 
 164 Martinez, 566 US at 19. 
 165 Id at 16 (majority). 
 166 For instance, duress likely provides an unproblematic coextensive remedy. If a 
prosecutor puts a gun to a defendant’s head and forces him to sign a plea agreement, du-
ress would make the plea agreement unenforceable in every instance of gun-to-head 
waiver. Likewise, as a constitutional matter, gun-to-head waiver would likely not be con-
sidered voluntary. 
 167 Martinez, 566 US at 19 (Scalia dissenting). 
 168 Id at 21. 
 169 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401 (Ho concurring) (emphasis omitted), quoting Adams v 
United States, 317 US 269, 280 (1942). 
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clauses on the grounds that it would create a coextensive alterna-
tive to a due process right to pre-plea disclosure. 
In short, a coextensive solution would risk transmogrifying 
this Comment into a shell game, arguing that it is an uphill battle 
to say that pre-plea disclosure is constitutionally required but 
then proposing a solution that provides the exact same outcome 
as a due process rule. Thus, a litigant seeking to utilize a plausi-
ble contract law doctrine in the pre-plea disclosure context should 
likely be able to point to relevant situations in which the contract 
law remedy would not apply. 
c) An apt contract doctrine must fit the typical pre-plea excul-
patory evidence situation.  The extremes of this principle are 
clear. The infancy doctrine, for instance, which often voids con-
tracts entered into by minors, would not be a suitable doctrine 
because many cases of pre-plea disclosure do not involve mi-
nors.170 A closer call are those contract doctrines that Blank pre-
sents, such as “adhesion, duress, mistake, [and] unconscionabil-
ity.”171 While no court has adopted any of these contract 
arguments, which may be indicative of their inapplicability, it is 
beyond the scope of this Comment to refute the viability of each 
contract doctrine contender. 
Regardless, a suitable contract law doctrine must rely on fac-
tors that will be present in every case of pre-plea disclosure. A 
good place to find these factors is in the progeny of Brady.172 Using 
the Court’s previous explications of Brady rights, the next Section 
suggests the use of a contract doctrine that maps well onto the 
pre-plea disclosure context. That doctrine is constructive fraud. 
B. Constructive Fraud Is a Suitable Remedy 
Constructive fraud is “a fraud that arises by the operation of 
law from conduct, which if sanctioned by law, would secure an 
unconscionable advantage, irrespective of the actual intent to de-
fraud.”173 Because constructive fraud usually emerges from state 
law, there is little agreement about the precise contours of each 
element and no Restatement provision that cleanly summarizes 
 
 170 See, for example, Douglass v Pflueger Hawaii, Inc, 135 P3d 129, 134 (Hawaii 2006) 
(noting agreement with the common law rule that “contracts entered into by minors are 
voidable”). 
 171 Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2074 (cited in note 10). 
 172 See Part I. 
 173 John Glenn and Karl Oakes, Fraud, 37 Corpus Juris Secundum § 5 (West 2019). 
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the elements. Courts, however, generally agree on several princi-
ples that one can group into four elements: (1) the defendant 
made a material, false representation; (2) the plaintiff reasonably 
relied on the defendant’s statement; (3) the plaintiff suffered 
some detriment as a result of this reliance; and (4) the defendant 
had a duty, arising out of a special relationship with the plaintiff, 
to give correct information.174 
Before showing that the typical pre-plea disclosure situation 
would satisfy the elements of constructive fraud, this Section be-
gins by outlining the three features of constructive fraud that 
make it a suitable contract law remedy. Next, this Section ex-
plains the mechanics of a constructive fraud claim, to show that, 
on a practical level, defendants could avail themselves of con-
structive fraud in the pre-plea disclosure context. 
1. Qualities of constructive fraud that make it suitable to 
the pre-plea disclosure situation. 
Constructive fraud has three distinctive qualities that make 
it particularly appealing in the pre-plea disclosure context. First, 
constructive fraud does not require a showing of intent. Second, 
constructive fraud requires a violation of a duty. Third, big boy 
clauses can defeat constructive fraud claims. While the presence 
of big boy clauses initially appears to threaten the efficacy of a 
constructive fraud solution, this Section argues that big boy 
clauses are the very things that make this Comment’s construc-
tive fraud regime more plausible than other contract doctrines 
that scholars have put forth. 
First, constructive fraud does not require a showing of in-
tent.175 Removal of the intent element reduces the burden on crim-
inal defendants, especially those with limited resources, who will 
likely have trouble proving that a prosecutor knew of or purpose-
fully withheld exculpatory evidence.176 Without the burden of an 
intent element, a constructive fraud claim is comparatively easier 
 
 174 See, for example, Specialty Beverages, LLC v Pabst Brewing Co, 537 F3d 1165, 
1180–81 (10th Cir 2008); Hydro Investors, Inc v Trafalgar Power Inc, 227 F3d 8, 20 (2d 
Cir 2000) (considering a claim for “negligent misrepresentation” instead of “constructive 
fraud,” though the doctrinal contours are identical); Doe v Boy Scouts of America, 329 F 
Supp 3d 1168, 1179 (D Idaho 2018). 
 175 Fraud, Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (West 10th ed 2014) (defining constructive 
fraud as “[u]nintentional deception”). 
 176 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convic-
tions, 57 Case W Res L Rev 651, 651 (2007) (noting that “prosecutors and police often have 
sole access to files containing Brady material”). 
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to bring than some civil causes of action, such as malicious  
prosecution.177 
Without a required showing of intent, constructive fraud 
maps nicely onto Kyles, which held that prosecutors have a duty 
to discover and disclose all exculpatory evidence in law enforce-
ment files.178 This duty means that a prosecutor is in “construc-
tive” possession of all exculpatory evidence in law enforcement 
files, even if he had no actual knowledge of that evidence.179 In a 
word, when claiming a Brady violation, a defendant need not 
prove knowledge or any other sort of scienter with regard to a 
specific prosecutor.180 In the same way, constructive fraud also 
eliminates any scienter requirement. This similarity is im-
portant. Kyles implicitly recognizes the difficulty defendants with 
otherwise meritorious Brady claims would have in proving scien-
ter and obtaining relief.181 Thus, a contract law doctrine that does 
not parallel Kyles would place a heavy burden on defendants. 
Second, constructive fraud requires a violation of a duty.182 
Because prosecutorial duties animated Kyles183 and Agurs,184 a 
constructive fraud claim is better tailored to pre-plea disclosure 
than other contract law arguments, which neglect to focus on the 
duties that animate Brady’s progeny. Moreover, as detailed be-
low, constructive fraud can involve a breach of an equitable as 
opposed to a legal duty.185 Thus, courts can find an equitable duty 
for prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea more 
easily than they can find an equivalent, constitutionally imposed 
legal duty.186 
Third, big boy clauses defeat constructive fraud claims. In 
contract law, big boy clauses are “no-reliance clauses . . . (as in 
‘we’re big boys and can look after ourselves’).”187 These clauses 
 
 177 Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers under Section 
1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 Temple Polit & CR L Rev 1, 47 (2003) (“[A] 
malicious prosecution claim generally requires . . . proof of malice.”) (citations omitted). 
 178 Kyles, 514 US at 437. 
 179 Dennis v Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 834 F3d 263, 288–89 
(3d Cir 2016). 
 180 Kyles, 514 US at 437. 
 181 Id (“[T]he prosecution . . . alone can know what is undisclosed.”). 
 182 Hydro Investors, 227 F3d at 20. 
 183 Kyles, 514 US at 437. 
 184 Agurs, 427 US at 111. 
 185 See Part III.C.4. 
 186 See Kyles, 514 US at 437. 
 187 Extra Equipamentos e Exportação Ltda v Case Corp, 541 F3d 719, 724 (7th Cir 
2008). See also, for example, In re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc, Investment 
Litigation, 905 F Supp 2d 814, 824 (SD Ohio 2012) (“The parties referred to the Letter 
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typically indicate that one party is “not relying on representations 
or statements made by the other party.”188 In the pre-plea disclo-
sure context, this clause would assert that the defendant decided 
to plead guilty of his own free will without reliance on the excul-
patory evidence or lack thereof in the prosecutor’s possession. For 
reasons developed below, these clauses would likely be enforcea-
ble and would likely defeat any constructive fraud claim.189 
The presence of these clauses might initially seem devastat-
ing to a constructive fraud regime because prosecutors could over-
use them. Regardless, big boy clauses are likely beneficial. The 
discussion of big boy clauses below shows that big boy clauses cre-
ate a practical distinction between a Brady-based due process 
rule and a constructive fraud regime, and that this distinction 
might assuage some concerns courts have with adopting coexten-
sive rules. 
2. Mechanics of a constructive fraud claim. 
Before showing that the typical pre-plea disclosure situation 
can satisfy the elements of constructive fraud, it is worth explain-
ing how a defendant would bring such a claim.190 Per Puckett v 
United States,191 courts can analyze plea agreements as contracts, 
subject to at least some ordinary contract principles.192 If the gov-
ernment commits fraud in a plea agreement, a court can declare 
the agreement unenforceable.193 If a plea agreement is unenforce-
able, one contractual remedy is rescission.194 Rescission allows the 
defendant to withdraw his consideration, namely his guilty 
 
Agreement as a ‘big boy’ agreement because [one of the parties] in essence said that it 
knew what it was doing and could take care of itself.”). 
 188 Extra Equipamentos, 541 F3d at 730. 
 189 See Part III.D. 
 190 This procedure is merely illustrative and somewhat oversimplified. While this 
Comment focuses on the theoretical plausibility of constructive fraud, a comprehensive 
explication of mechanics is further warranted. 
 191 556 US 129 (2009). 
 192 See id at 136–38. The contract law analogy fails in other respects due to constitu-
tional limitations. For instance, prosecutors cannot request specific performance, as “it is 
unconstitutional to compel a criminal defendant to plead guilty.” Julie A. Lumpkin, The 
Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a Defendant Has Materially Breached a 
Plea Agreement, 55 Fordham L Rev 1059, 1069 (1987). 
 193 See Puckett, 556 US at 137. It will not do to argue that if constructive fraud inval-
idates a plea, it makes the plea involuntary in a constitutional sense. Even if this is so, 
this due process violation is a different sort of due process violation than one that would 
come from extending Brady. This difference is evident from the likely enforceability of big 
boy clauses. See Part III.D. 
 194 Puckett, 556 US at 137. 
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plea.195 Both fraud and constructive fraud can be the basis for re-
scinding a contract.196 This procedure for withdrawing a plea is 
not novel, and the Supreme Court endorsed it in Puckett.197 Lest 
the reader dismiss Puckett as an academic exercise with little 
practical bite, the Court has explicitly allowed a lower court to 
consider rescinding a plea agreement when a prosecutor breached 
that agreement.198 In short, the Court is willing to rescind plea 
agreements that are obtained by fraud. 
In order to rescind a plea agreement, the defendant should 
promptly file a motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court after 
he discovers the exculpatory evidence.199 To be clear, if at all pos-
sible a defendant should not bring this claim for the first time on 
appeal, as he would face even more obstacles.200 The defendant 
should also avoid bringing this claim for the first time when seek-
ing state post-conviction relief or habeas corpus review, as these 
collateral proceedings could skew the outcome, depending on pro-
cedural posture.201 The role of the trial court is to determine 
“whether the Government’s conduct comports with the parties’ 
reasonable understanding of the agreement.”202 When a defend-
ant brings a motion to withdraw, the defendant has the burden of 
proving constructive fraud by a preponderance of the evidence.203 
Finally, the text of the plea agreement would determine the 
success of a constructive fraud claim. Constructive fraud claims 
by definition seek to rescind an agreement that the claimant be-
lieves to be fraudulent.204 The text of the actual agreement, how-
ever, will determine the respective rights and expectations of the 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. See Curtis Lumber Co, Inc v Louisiana Pacific Corp, 618 F3d 762, 774 n 4 (8th 
Cir 2010) (“Constructive fraud can exist in cases of rescission of contracts.”). 
 197 Puckett, 556 US at 137. 
 198 See Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262–63 (1971). 
 199 See, for example, United States v Price, 95 F3d 364, 369 (5th Cir 1996) (explaining 
that the defendant was unable to appeal a court’s decision regarding his plea because he 
failed to withdraw that plea). 
 200 If the defendant did not raise this issue until an appeal, the defendant would have 
to show a plain error in the district court’s ruling, which would put a heavier burden on 
the defendant. See Puckett, 556 US at 135. 
 201 See Friedman, 618 F3d at 154 (“It is enough to say that the holding of the Nassau 
County Court . . . does not constitute an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court prec-
edent as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) requires.”). 
 202 See Price, 95 F3d at 367. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See Glenn and Oakes, Fraud, 37 Corpus Juris Secundum § 5 (cited in note 173). 
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parties, and hence their abilities to bring claims against one an-
other.205 One can imagine numerous ways in which a plea agree-
ment could deal with exculpatory evidence. This Comment fo-
cuses on three that appear especially salient. 
Thus, while the next Section analyzes each of the four ele-
ments of constructive fraud in turn, its discussion of each perti-
nent element weaves in discussions of two possible plea agree-
ment permutations: First, the prosecutor could agree to turn over 
all exculpatory evidence. This permutation is worth considering 
because some prosecutors already use this language.206 Second, 
the agreement could omit any statement about exculpatory evi-
dence. This permutation is worth addressing, because it appears 
to be the DOJ’s dominant approach.207 Finally, in Part III.D, this 
Comment analyzes a third permutation: the agreement could in-
clude a big boy clause. This permutation is worth considering be-
cause it presents a theoretical challenge to a constructive fraud 
regime. 
C. Application of the Typical Pre-plea Exculpatory Evidence 
Situation to the Elements of Constructive Fraud 
As noted above, courts generally agree on several principles 
of constructive fraud that can be grouped as four elements: (1) the 
defendant made a material, false representation; (2) the plaintiff 
reasonably relied on the defendant’s statement; (3) the plaintiff 
suffered some detriment as a result of this reliance; and (4) the 
defendant had a duty, arising out of a special relationship with 
the plaintiff, to give correct information.208 Because a successful 
constructive fraud claim in the pre-plea disclosure context must 
prove each of these elements, this Section considers each in turn. 
 
 205 See, for example, Extra Equipamentos, 541 F3d at 724 (“The purpose of such a 
clause is to head off a suit for fraud.”). 
 206 This form mirrors the agreement in Ruiz. Ruiz, 536 US at 625 (“[The plea agree-
ment] specifies that any known information establishing the factual innocence of the de-
fendant has been turned over to the defendant.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 207 See generally, for example, Model Annotated Individual Plea Agreement (Depart-
ment of Justice), archived at http://perma.cc/8NMY-8MN2; Plea Agreement for United 
States v. Rabobank, National, Association (Department of Justice), archived at 
http://perma.cc/964C-KRPT; Plea Agreement: United States v. Lindh, (Department of Jus-
tice, Mar 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/L9SG-P2RR. 
 208 See note 174. 
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1. The prosecutor made a material, false representation. 
The three components of this element are representation, 
materiality, and scienter.209 The first part of this element is that 
the prosecutor must have made a false representation. In one per-
mutation of a plea agreement, the prosecutor might affirmatively 
state that he has disclosed all exculpatory evidence known to the 
government. This affirmative statement could theoretically come 
from an oral promise, but it would more likely come from the writ-
ten plea agreement itself.210 Thus, if a prosecutor makes a repre-
sentation that the government possesses no exculpatory evi-
dence—even though the government did in fact possess 
exculpatory evidence—then a defendant can satisfy the represen-
tation element. 
A plea agreement that omits any statement concerning excul-
patory evidence at first appears to commit no fraud, as fraud usu-
ally requires a false statement. Thus, a defendant would have to 
overcome the hurdle of proving that an omission counts as a mis-
representation in this context. There is ample reason to accept 
this conclusion. The DOJ’s own policy requires that prosecutors 
turn over exculpatory evidence reasonably promptly after its dis-
covery.211 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also require 
that prosecutors timely disclose exculpatory evidence.212 
Taken alone, these professional and ethical rules provide lit-
tle consolation to defendants seeking a means of rescission. In the 
constructive fraud context, however, they have more bite. For in-
stance, Indiana’s and Colorado’s versions of constructive fraud al-
low an omission to qualify as a representation when the omitting 
party has a duty to reveal some fact.213 The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 161 also concludes that a nondisclosure can be 
equivalent to an assertion in several situations, including one in 
which “the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a 
 
 209 While scienter is not an independent element of constructive fraud, states take 
divergent approaches with regard to whether there is a scienter requirement for specific 
elements of constructive fraud. For the sake of thoroughness, this Comment analyzes sci-
enter as if it is a hard and fast part of this element. 
 210 See, for example, Ruiz, 536 US at 625. 
 211 United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-5.001(D)(1), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
S9EY-BKDF. 
 212 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) Rule 3.8(d) (ABA 2018). 
 213 See, for example, Trytko v Hubbell, Inc, 28 F3d 715, 728 (7th Cir 1994) (applying 
Indiana law); Specialty Beverages, 537 F3d at 1180 (applying Colorado law). 
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relation of trust and confidence between them.”214 While the rela-
tionship that the Restatement contemplates initially seems to be 
that of a defense lawyer and her client, prosecutors have duties 
to defendants that likely fit this description.215 Thus, even if a plea 
agreement is silent regarding exculpatory evidence, a defendant 
can argue that an omission is the equivalent of a representation 
for constructive fraud purposes, because, if exculpatory evidence 
were in the government’s possession, the prosecutor would have 
had ethical and professional duties to disclose it.216 
The second part of this element is materiality. Both constitu-
tional and contract law provide useful definitions. Exculpatory 
evidence is material under Bagley “only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”217 This 
“reasonable probability” is present when the evidence creates “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of 
a trial.218 There are a few problems with using Bagley’s definition 
of materiality. First, the Bagley definition is designed for the trial 
context, as evidenced by the “proceeding” language. It is unclear 
how one would translate the “undermine confidence in the out-
come” standard to the guilty plea context.219 Second, while  
Bagley’s standard applies to the materiality of the evidence,  
constructive fraud is concerned with the materiality of the mis-
representation. Third, this Comment seeks to avoid coextensive 
solutions. Any regime that imports a due process definition into a 
contract law regime likely raises the specter of a coextensive so-
lution. Thus, a contract law definition of materiality is likely  
more apt. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts views materiality 
from the perspective of the individual who makes the misrepre-
sentation.220 The Restatement concludes that a statement is ma-
terial if “the maker knows that for some special reason it is likely 
 
 214 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(d) (1979). 
 215 See Part III.C.4. 
 216 The presence of professional and ethical duties does not render the proposed con-
structive fraud regime nugatory. Even if prosecutors received discipline for every viola-
tion, knowledge that a prosecutor got fired is little consolation to the incarcerated, inno-
cent defendant. 
 217 Bagley, 473 US at 682. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162, cmt c (1979). 
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to induce the particular recipient to manifest his assent.”221 This 
definition translates to the exculpatory evidence context because 
the “special reason” is that a defendant, in pleading guilty, must 
attempt to ascertain the strength of the prosecutor’s case. 
Knowledge of whether the government possesses exculpatory ev-
idence helps the defendant evaluate the prosecutor’s case, and 
prosecutors are likely well aware that defendants desire infor-
mation about the strength of the prosecution’s case.222 Thus, a 
prosecutor would know that his representation that he has no ex-
culpatory evidence will likely induce defendants to accept plea 
agreements. 
The third part of this element is whether a prosecutor must 
have scienter with regard to the falsity and materiality of the 
statement. Intent to deceive is not an element of constructive 
fraud.223 This still does not rule out the possibility, however, that 
courts would require scienter with regard to other elements of 
constructive fraud. For instance, some courts require that the 
promisor “made a false representation that he or she should have 
known was incorrect.”224 While constructive fraud claims may or 
may not require knowledge, such a requirement is likely irrele-
vant for pre-plea disclosure claims. Kyles held that prosecutors 
have a duty to discover exculpatory evidence known to other 
agents of the government.225 Thus, when a governmental entity 
working with the prosecution possesses exculpatory evidence, 
courts impute that entity’s knowledge of its possession to the 
prosecutor.226 Courts would likely have little problem imputing 
governmental knowledge of exculpatory evidence to the prosecu-
tor in the constructive fraud context. In short, constructive fraud 
requires a defendant to show that the government possessed ex-
culpatory evidence at the time of the plea agreement, and this 
requirement is no more demanding than the requirements of a 
due process claim under Kyles. 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L J at 1937 (cited in note 137) (“Based on the different 
packages of information each side has, both must generate an estimate of the likelihood 
that [the defendant] will be convicted if the case goes to trial.”). 
 223 See note 175. 
 224 Hydro Investors, 227 F3d at 20 (emphasis added). 
 225 514 US at 437. 
 226 See, for example, Dennis, 834 F3d at 288–89. See also United States v Barcelo, 628 
Fed Appx 36, 38 (2d Cir 2015) (“A prosecutor is deemed to have constructive knowledge of 
information known to persons who are a part of the prosecution team.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
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2. The criminal defendant reasonably relied on the false 
representation. 
Unlike materiality, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
views reliance from the perspective of the defrauded party.227 
When a prosecutor makes an affirmative representation or omits 
to say anything about exculpatory evidence, there are good rea-
sons to think that a defendant is reasonable in relying on that 
statement or omission. First, a defendant is reasonable in believ-
ing that prosecutors will tell the truth because prosecutors have 
a duty to tell the truth.228 Furthermore, the DOJ and ABA require 
that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence reasonably 
promptly after its discovery.229 It is reasonable to rely on prosecu-
tors to follow ABA rules and DOJ policy along with, in the case of 
affirmative misrepresentations, a prosecutor’s duty to tell the 
truth.230 
3. The criminal defendant suffered some detriment as a 
result of this reliance. 
Detriment can manifest in several ways. A defendant who 
signs a plea agreement gives up legal rights, such as the right to 
a trial and the right to cross-examine witnesses, as considera-
tion.231 He gives up these rights at least partly in reliance on the 
prosecutor’s omission or representation that she possesses no ex-
culpatory evidence. Forgone legal rights constitute legal detri-
ment under contract law.232 In addition to forgone legal rights, a 
criminal defendant also suffers a detriment by being convicted 
and potentially serving a sentence, when he would have been  
acquitted had he possessed exculpatory evidence. Finally, a  
 
 227 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162, cmt c (1979). 
 228 See Davis v Zant, 36 F3d 1538, 1548 n 15 (11th Cir 1994) (noting that “prosecutors 
have a special duty of integrity in their arguments”); United States v Kojayan, 8 F3d 1315, 
1323 (9th Cir 1993) (noting that “lawyers representing the government in criminal cases 
serve truth and justice first”). 
 229 See notes 211–12. 
 230 It will not do to say that a defendant can hire a private investigator to unearth 
exculpatory evidence. The accused cares less about what evidence is out there in the world, 
and more about what evidence a prosecutor has, because that is the evidence that a jury 
will likely see. Thus, it is only the prosecutor’s representations concerning that evidence 
upon which a defendant can rely. 
 231 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 399–400 (Ho concurring). 
 232 Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 691 (1994) (Scalia concurring). 
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defendant who would still have pleaded guilty but, with exculpa-
tory evidence in hand, could have negotiated a better plea deal, 
would suffer a detriment by having to serve a longer sentence. 
4. Prosecutors have a duty, arising out of a special 
relationship with criminal defendants, to provide 
defendants with correct information. 
This element is likely the least intuitive in the pre-plea dis-
closure context and thus deserves the most rigorous analysis. 
First, this Section evaluates case law to define the contours of the 
duty that courts require to establish constructive fraud. Second, 
this Section argues that prosecutors have a duty to disclose excul-
patory evidence that fits within these contours. 
a) The duty required to show constructive fraud.  Constructive 
fraud is “a breach of legal or equitable duty.”233 The Corpus Juris 
Secundum characterizes constructive fraud as a “breach of duty 
which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares to be fraudu-
lent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to 
injure public interests.”234 While a fiduciary duty is the prototyp-
ical example of constructive fraud’s predicate duty, a fiduciary 
duty is not always necessary to establish a constructive fraud 
claim.235 A breach of an equitable duty is also sufficient to satisfy 
this element of constructive fraud.236 As scholars have not applied 
this equitable duty to the pre-plea disclosure context, it is helpful 
to analogize to similar situations in which courts have found the 
predicate duty for constructive fraud. 
To determine whether an equitable duty exists, courts look to 
the relative positions of each party. The Seventh Circuit, applying 
Illinois law, noted a breach of equitable duty may exist “where 
there is great inequality between the parties.”237 The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas likewise looks to “the relative position of the 
parties [ ] and their means of information such[ ] that the one 
 
 233 Glenn and Oakes, Fraud, 37 Corpus Juris Secundum § 5 (cited in note 173) (em-
phasis added). 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id at § 7 (“[A]lthough there is authority to the contrary, it has been held that con-
structive fraud does not require the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.”). 
 236 See, for example, Abrams v Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp, 663 F Supp 2d 1220, 
1227 (SD Ala 2009) (noting that under Alabama law, constructive fraud involves a “breach 
of a legal or equitable duty”); ADCS Inc v Kimbrough, Jr, 30 Fed Appx 225, 229 (4th Cir 
2002) (“Under Maryland law a key element of constructive fraud is the breach of a legal 
or equitable duty.”). 
 237 Houben v Telular Corp, 231 F3d 1066, 1075 (7th Cir 2000). 
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must necessarily be presumed to contract upon the faith reposed 
in the statements of the other,” and rescinds a contract when 
“only the party making the contractual commitments [ ] was in a 
position to know whether or not its commitments would be hon-
ored.”238 For example, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) promised 
a “safe, wholesome and protected environment for children.”239 A 
court held that it was reasonable to conclude that the requisite 
relationship existed between individual scouts and the BSA to es-
tablish the BSA’s equitable duty to protect children, by excluding 
child predators from the organization.240 
On the other hand, in the business context, courts do not find 
equitable duties in “arm’s length transactions between parties 
seeking to further their own objectives.”241 Thus, there is no equi-
table duty between two contracting multinational corporations.242 
Moreover, an ordinary employment contract cannot establish an 
equitable duty.243 At the extreme, when the party bringing the 
constructive fraud claim has superior knowledge, all things being 
equal, an equitable duty does not attach.244 
b) Prosecutorial duties.  The next task is to examine the du-
ties of the prosecutor. To satisfy a constructive fraud claim, two 
aspects of the duty must be present. First, a prosecutor must have 
an equitable duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea. Sec-
ond, this duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea must be 
the sort of equitable duty contemplated by constructive fraud  
regimes. 
Prosecutors have an equitable duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence pre-plea. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct re-
quire that prosecutors “make timely disclosure to the defense of 
all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
 
 238 Cardiac Thoracic and Vascular Surgery, P.A. Profit Sharing Trust v Bond, 840 
SW2d 188, 192–93 (Ark 1992). See also Saint Annes Development Co, LLC v Trabich, 737 
F Supp 2d 517, 531 (D Md 2010) (finding the requisite duty when “one party gains influ-
ence and superiority as a result of the confidence placed in him by the other party”). 
 239 Boy Scouts, 329 F Supp 3d at 1172. 
 240 Id at 1184 (“[T]he Court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence in 
the record from which a jury could reasonably find that BSA occupied a superior position 
of influence and authority over [the plaintiffs]. . . . The Court finds that there is.”). 
 241 Saint Annes, 737 F Supp 2d at 531. 
 242 Bridgestone America’s, Inc v International Business Machines Corp, 172 F Supp 
3d 1007, 1015 (MD Tenn 2016). 
 243 Houben, 231 F3d at 1075. See also Razdan v General Motors Corp, 979 F Supp 
755, 758 (ND Ill 1997). 
 244 Garbutt v Southern Clays, Inc, 894 F Supp 456, 461–62 (MD Ga 1995). 
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negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense” regard-
less of the stage in the criminal process.245 When a prosecutor be-
lieves that new evidence creates a reasonable likelihood that a 
convicted defendant did not commit an offense, the prosecutor 
must disclose the evidence to the court,246 disclose the evidence to 
the defendant,247 and undertake further investigation.248 Once the 
evidence reaches the level of clear and convincing, a prosecutor 
must also seek to remedy the conviction.249 In short, the Model 
Rules provide several safeguards vis-à-vis exculpatory evidence, 
the minimum of which is timely disclosure to the accused. 
Prosecutors also have an ethical duty to tell the truth. Under 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct § 3.3(a)(1), no lawyer may 
knowingly make false statements to a tribunal.250 Prosecutors 
also have a constitutional duty to tell the truth.251 A prosecutor 
breaches his duty to tell the truth when he makes an affirmative 
misrepresentation about exculpatory evidence. Concerning omis-
sions, there must be a factual basis for any guilty plea, and often 
prosecutors orally provide such a basis in open court, in order to 
satisfy the court that “the conduct which the defendant admits 
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment . . . to which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty.”252 Thus, some judges have already 
recognized that a prosecutor providing a factual basis for a guilty 
plea in open court, who does not explain the presence of exculpa-
tory evidence, violates a prosecutor’s duty to tell the truth.253 
Finally, a prosecutor has fiduciary duties.254 A prosecutor’s fi-
duciary duty to the government is different than his duty to de-
fendants because this duty “transcend[s] personal ownership” of 
 
 245 Model Rules, Rule 3.8(d). 
 246 Model Rules, Rule 3.8(g)(1). 
 247 Model Rules, Rule 3.8(g)(2)(i). 
 248 Model Rules, Rule 3.8(g)(2)(ii). 
 249 Model Rules, Rule 3.8(h). 
 250 Model Rules, Rule 3.3(a)(1). 
 251 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 Georgetown J Legal 
Ethics 309, 314 (2001) (“The duty to truth also derives from the prosecutor’s constitutional 
obligation not to use false evidence.”). 
 252 FRCrP 11(b)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment. 
 253 See Alvarez, 904 F3d at 407 (Costa dissenting). 
 254 This fiduciary duty maps well onto constructive fraud, as constructive fraud may 
be found by showing “[t]he failure of the fiduciary to disclose a material fact to the princi-
pal that might affect the fiduciary’s motives or the principal’s decision, which is known (or 
should be known) to the fiduciary.” James L. Rigelhaubt, Trustee’s Representation That It 
Possessed Expert Knowledge or Skill, 19 Am Juris Proof of Facts 2d 45 § 1. 
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a right by the defendant and is instead “meant to serve the inter-
est of the federal judicial system.”255 Thus, a prosecutor’s fiduciary 
duty means that he must “act in accordance with the client’s in-
terests and objectives.”256 The government’s objectives include, 
first, avoiding punishment of innocents, and second, “affording 
the accused . . . a lawful, fair process.”257 
Each of these objectives requires pre-plea disclosure. First, 
the objective of avoiding punishment of innocents requires safe-
guards. At trial, one of these safeguards is disclosure of exculpa-
tory evidence.258 As the government’s objective of avoiding pun-
ishment of innocents does not dissipate in the plea context, the 
fiduciary duty to act in accordance with that objective remains. 
Second, the objective of affording a criminal defendant a fair pro-
cess also requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence at trial.259 As 
the government’s fiduciary duty to give the defendant a fair pro-
cess does not dissipate in the plea context, the fiduciary duty to 
act in accordance with that objective remains. Finally, DOJ policy 
is at least one manifestation of the government’s objectives. As 
DOJ policy requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence reasonably 
promptly regardless of the stage of a case,260 a prosecutor must 
disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea as part of his fiduciary du-
ties to the government. All of these duties are similar to what 
Professor Bruce A. Green describes as, “ethical obligation[s], in-
dependent of similar obligations imposed by the Due Process 
Clause, criminal procedure rules and statutes.”261 
Recall that constructive fraud is a “breach of duty which . . . 
the law declares to be fraudulent because of its tendency to de-
ceive, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests.”262 When 
a prosecutor acts in contravention of his ethical duties, that action 
 
 255 Blank, 68 Fordham L Rev at 2048 (cited in note 10), quoting Mezzanatto, 513 US 
at 214 (Souter dissenting). 
 256 Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 Fordham Urban L J 
607, 634 (1999). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Brady, 373 US at 87. 
 259 Id. 
 260 See note 211. 
 261 Green, 26 Fordham Urban L J at 616 (cited in note 256). Unlike the duties of or-
dinary attorneys, this duty creates a quasi-judicial function for a prosecutor. Id at 635. 
Pennsylvania Chief Justice George Sharswood, in an 1852 essay that the ABA used as the 
foundation for its first code of ethics, considers the duty of an attorney general to be that 
of a public trust, describing an attorney general as being as impartial as a judge. Id at 612. 
 262 Glenn and Oakes, Fraud, 37 Corpus Juris Secundum § 5 (cited in note 173) (em-
phasis added). 
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likely violates public confidence in the criminal justice system. 
When a prosecutor violates his duty to tell the truth, that action 
tends to deceive. Finally, when a prosecutor violates his fiduciary 
duties by failing to act in accordance with the government’s objec-
tives, that injures the public interest of having an executive that 
fulfills the government’s objectives. In short, it is clear that a 
prosecutor has an equitable duty to turn over exculpatory evi-
dence pre-plea. 
Next, this prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence 
pre-plea is the sort of equitable duty contemplated by constructive 
fraud regimes. It is true that arms-length relationships, such as 
business transactions and employment contracts, do not present 
the requisite equitable duty.263 The situation of a person advocat-
ing that another be deprived of his liberty, however, does not re-
semble the typical arms-length transaction. For instance, “an 
arms-length transaction is characterized by three elements: it is 
voluntary, i.e., without compulsion or duress; it generally takes 
place in an open market; and the parties act in their own  
self-interest.”264 A criminal defendant is compelled to engage in  
the criminal process; he cannot simply walk away. While plea- 
agreements are no doubt voluntary in a constitutional sense,265 
the element of compulsion militates against characterizing a plea 
agreement as an arms-length transaction. Further, plea negotia-
tions can be characterized as a market,266 but not as an open mar-
ket: a defendant may not abstain from the criminal process or find 
a different prosecutor with whom to bargain. 
Furthermore, plea bargains often involve a great deal of ine-
quality between the two parties, a characteristic that typifies con-
structive fraud’s predicate duty.267 While prosecutors have some 
professional, resource, and docket constraints, prosecutors are 
 
 263 See Saint Annes, 737 F Supp 2d at 531; Houben, 231 F3d at 1075. One counterar-
gument is that a defendant knows whether he committed the crime, and superior 
knowledge often disproves any equitable duty. Garbutt, 894 F Supp at 461–62. While it is 
true that a defendant’s knowledge of whether he committed the crime might be a proxy 
for the kind of evidence that the prosecutor has or will have, Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L 
J at 1941 (cited in note 137), there is little guarantee that this is an accurate proxy. See 
John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 
50 Emory L J 437, 450 (2001). In fact, the cases that provide the exigency for this Comment 
are those in which a defendant, despite believing his innocence, believes that his 
knowledge has failed to translate into evidence that comports with reality. 
 264 Bison Township v Perkins County, 607 NW2d 589, 593 (SD 2000). 
 265 See Ruiz, 536 US at 629. 
 266 See Part III.D. 
 267 See Houben, 231 F3d at 1075. 
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generally free to bring any charges they see fit,268 so long as these 
charges comport with the prosecutor’s duty to do justice.269 There 
is no obligation for prosecutors to plea bargain.270 Moreover, pros-
ecutorial immunity denies “civil remedies to innocent people who 
have been wrongly convicted of crimes as a result of prosecutorial 
misconduct.”271 A prosecutor mainly faces professional repercus-
sions for his actions.272 Thus, a prosecutor has little to lose and 
much to gain from plea bargaining. The defendant, on the other 
hand, faces a bleaker situation. With regard to charging and sen-
tencing recommendations, he is largely at the prosecutor’s mercy. 
He does not have the resources of the government’s investigatory 
power at his disposal. Even though the representation of counsel 
improves the defendant’s bargaining position, the very structure 
of the criminal system puts the prosecutor in a position of power. 
Precedent also shows that the Court might be willing to find 
an equitable duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea of the 
sort contemplated by constructive fraud regimes. In Agurs, the 
Court concluded explicitly that a prosecutor’s duty “illuminates” 
the standard of materiality in the exculpatory evidence disclosure 
context.273 A prosecutor also has a duty to do justice, and Agurs 
thus found that materiality is present when there is concern with 
the “justice of the finding of guilt.”274 Thus, prosecutorial duties 
informed the Court in requiring exculpatory evidence disclosure 
in the past. 
The Court’s distinction between constitutional and noncon-
stitutional duties also shows that an equitable duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence pre-plea is plausible. The Court uses broad 
language to characterize nonconstitutional duties. Perhaps the 
 
 268 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure As a Market System, 12 J Legal 
Stud 289, 299 (1983). 
 269 See Agurs, 427 US at 111. 
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most compelling description of a prosecutor’s nonconstitutional 
duty comes from Berger v United States. 
Speaking for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr 
concluded that prosecutors do not have a duty to win, but instead 
a duty to see that justice is done.275 This duty to seek justice en-
tails a duty to avoid improper methods and to make sure that in-
nocent people do not suffer criminal convictions.276 Justice Holmes 
best summarized this duty with his oft-repeated statement that 
“while [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones.”277 The Court did not couch these descriptions in 
constitutional language. By contrast, in Ruiz, the Court used con-
stitutional language when it found no constitutional duty to dis-
close impeachment evidence pre-plea.278 Thus, a prosecutor’s eq-
uitable duty is broader than his constitutional duty.279 Lest the 
distinction be dismissed as different rhetorical styles employed by 
judges decades apart, the Court explicitly recognizes the distinc-
tion between ethical and constitutional duties when it comes to 
exculpatory evidence disclosure.280 The hesitation of courts to ex-
tend the purview of a prosecutor’s constitutional duty, therefore, 
does not apply to the prosecutor’s equitable duty. As a result, the 
distinction between equitable and constitutional duties is the key 
distinction that would allow a claim of constructive fraud while 
prohibiting a due process claim. 
One counterargument is that the duties of a prosecutor to dis-
close exculpatory evidence only entail a relational duty between 
the prosecutor and the DOJ or ABA. For a defendant to bring a 
constructive fraud claim, the argument goes, these duties must 
also entail a relational duty between the prosecutor and the de-
fendant. There are a few alternative responses. 
Many of the aforementioned duties do in fact entail a rela-
tional duty to defendants. While it is true that some attorneys 
never owe a duty of care to adverse parties in litigation,281 this 
 
 275 See Berger, 295 US at 88. 
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 278 See Ruiz, 536 US at 633 (noting that “the Constitution does not require . . .”). 
 279 See Gershman, 14 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 328 (cited in note 251) (“The pros-
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limitation does not extend to prosecutors.282 Prosecutors have du-
ties to adverse parties. For instance, a prosecutor has a constitu-
tional duty of fairness to the accused, requiring the prosecutor to 
comply “with the requirements of due process throughout the 
trial,” one of which is Brady.283 Besides the constitutional duty, 
the prosecutor’s “duty to the accused . . . is likewise recognized in 
the Code of Professional Responsibility,” which was promulgated 
by the ABA.284 Thus, there is little reason to think that the insti-
tution promulgating a rule that imposes a duty must necessarily 
be the exclusive recipient of that duty. 
Even if a court relied on a prosecutor’s fiduciary duty to the 
government to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea, construc-
tive fraud likely does not require a duty to the defendant. Instead, 
constructive fraud requires a general duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, the consequences of which flow to the defendant. Recall 
that constructive fraud is “a breach of legal or equitable duty, 
trust, or confidence that results in damage to another”285 or a 
“breach of duty which . . . the law declares to be fraudulent be-
cause of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to injure 
public interests.”286 Each definition focuses on injury to “another” 
or to “public interests,” but neither requires that the duty be owed 
to the claimant. While some states have held otherwise, many 
states do not require that the duty run to the claimant.287 
Finally, if any court decides both that constructive fraud’s 
predicate duty must run to defendants and that prosecutors’ duty 
to disclose exculpatory evidence pre-plea does not run to defend-
ants, courts could apply the policy rationale underlying the third-
party beneficiary doctrine, namely that “[a] nonparty becomes le-
gally entitled to a benefit promised in a contract . . . only if the 
contracting parties so intend.”288 It is true that legitimacy of the 
system is likely one intended benefit of, for example, ethical rules. 
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One would be missing the elephant in the room, however, to ig-
nore that another intended beneficiary of pre-plea disclosure is 
the person for whom the exculpatory evidence could prevent in-
carceration. In fact, Brady’s concern about giving defendants a 
fair trial confirms that defendants are the intended beneficiary of 
exculpatory evidence disclosure.289 
D. Big Boy Clauses 
If courts increase the rate of rescinded plea agreements based 
on constructive fraud appeals, the possibility arises that prosecu-
tors will simply include boilerplate “big boy” clauses in every plea 
agreement. In contract law, big boy clauses are “no-reliance 
clauses . . . (as in ‘we’re big boys and can look after ourselves’).”290 
Big boy clauses are meant to “head off” a suit for fraud.291 In the 
constructive fraud context, they do so by negating the “reasonable 
reliance” element. This clause, in a basic form, would assert that 
the defendant decided to plead guilty of his own free will without 
reliance on the exculpatory evidence or lack thereof in the prose-
cutor’s possession. If these big boy clauses gain traction, the ar-
gument goes, then constructive fraud claims are dead on arrival. 
While big boy clauses are enforceable in many states,292 there 
are valid arguments that big boy clauses would not be enforceable 
in the pre-plea disclosure context. To see why, one must discern 
what sort of person or entity counts as a “big boy.” Often, big boys 
are sophisticated parties.293 For instance, courts consider large 
companies and presidents of large companies, who are repre-
sented by lawyers, to be big boys.294 Unrepresented lay persons, 
on the other hand, may not always be big boys.295 
Thus, the argument goes, this is not the commercial context, 
and if anyone should not be considered a big boy, it is criminal 
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defendants who have the most to lose from big boy clauses and 
who are the least likely to understand the implications of such 
clauses. In short, it is conceivable that some courts may not en-
force big boy clauses in the pre-plea disclosure context. Alterna-
tively, some courts might allow only white-collar defendants, such 
as company executives, to employ big boy clauses. Presumably, 
these defendants have the requisite sophistication, based on both 
their knowledge and access to resources.296 
While this argument has some appeal, courts might resist it. 
Many criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a law-
yer, and generally, if a party is represented by a lawyer who ex-
plains the implications of a big boy clause, courts enforce the 
clause.297 Judge Richard Posner, for instance, noted that big boy 
clauses are enforceable so long as “the signatory knew what he 
was doing,” and a court will likely deem that a defendant repre-
sented by counsel knew what he was doing.298 Finally, parties can 
bring constructive fraud claims outside the commercial context,299 
so there is little reason to think that courts would allow a criminal 
defendant to bring a constructive fraud claim, without also allow-
ing a clause that negates such a claim. 
 
 296 This alternative is fairly problematic. Parsing defendants based on sophistication 
might force courts to hear procedural unconscionability arguments, like those that did not 
gain traction in Ruiz. See Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc v Jones, 714 NW2d 155, 166 
(Wis 2006) (finding that procedural unconscionability requires consideration of “age, edu-
cation, intelligence, business acumen and experience, [and] relative bargaining power”). 
This route might also raise equal protection concerns. In the criminal context, the Court 
has found that “the State could not in effect make [a procedure] available only to the 
wealthy. Such a disposition violated equal protection principles because it distinguished 
between poor and rich with respect to such a vital right.” Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 404 
(1985). One could imagine a poor defendant claiming an equal protection violation based 
on his exclusion from the use of big boy clauses. 
 297 See, for example, Extra Equipamentos, 541 F3d at 725. One concern is that not all 
defendants utilize counsel at the plea stage and that unrepresented defendants will be 
bamboozled into signing big boy clauses. The Court has found that “the negotiation of a 
plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel,” and defendants are entitled to counsel at any critical 
phase. Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356, 373 (2010). Defendants, however, may waive this 
right and plead guilty pro se; in one prominent exoneration study, five out of nine of the 
innocent defendants who pleaded guilty were not represented by counsel. Emily Hughes, 
Innocence Unmodified, 89 NC L Rev 1083, 1096 (2011). Courts would likely not enforce 
big boy clauses against these unrepresented defendants. 
 298 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc v Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 589 F3d 881, 885 (7th 
Cir 2009) (citations omitted). 
 299 Doe v Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2012 
WL 3782454, *7 (D Idaho) (“[A]ctions for constructive fraud may arise outside the com-
mercial context.”). 
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Moreover, defendants are generally entitled to waive even 
their constitutional rights in plea agreements.300 Defendants may 
also waive their statutory rights under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in plea agreements, so there is reason to think the Court 
would do the same for rights created by contract law.301 Thus, 
while there is a valid argument that some courts will not enforce 
big boy clauses, it is worth considering how courts might deal with 
them if they are enforced. 
The criminal justice system can deal with big boy clauses in 
three main ways: (1) prohibit all big boy clauses in plea agree-
ments, (2) allow only defendants to offer big boy clauses as part 
of a plea agreement, or (3) allow largely uninhibited bargaining.302 
This Comment proposes that the third solution, that of open bar-
gaining, best safeguards innocent defendants. First, this Com-
ment explains the problems with each limitation on the use of big 
boy clauses, along with the benefits of open bargaining. Second, 
this Comment proposes that any regulation should come in the 
form of modifications to judicial plea colloquies. 
1. Open bargaining best safeguards innocent defendants. 
The first solution, prohibiting all big boy clauses, has intui-
tive appeal. If prosecutors can circumvent constitutional obliga-
tions at trial and constructive fraud obligations in a plea agree-
ment by simply copying and pasting boilerplate language, a 
constructive fraud regime seems to be an unsatisfying safeguard. 
The concern is that a prosecutor could essentially hold a defend-
ant’s feet to the fire by refusing to sign a plea agreement until the 
defendant disclaimed reliance. Banning big boy clauses would 
solve this problem. 
Banning big boy clauses, however, might mean that pre-plea 
disclosure is still required by constructive fraud in every situation. 
Recall that constructive fraud requires pre-plea disclosure, and 
that, barring some other doctrine that categorically defeats an el-
ement of a constructive fraud claim, big boy clauses appear to be 
the only way to preemptively defeat constructive fraud argu-
ments.303 Banning big boy clauses, therefore, raises the specter of 
 
 300 See Alvarez, 904 F3d at 399–400 (Ho concurring). 
 301 See Mezzanatto, 513 US at 210. 
 302 To be sure, there are other alternatives, such as allowing only prosecutors to offer 
big boy clauses or regulating their use somewhat. 
 303 See notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
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contract law arguments that are coextensive with constitutional 
arguments, which raises two problems. 
First, the Court might as a theoretical matter be skeptical 
about signing off on a constructive fraud regime that ensures 
largely the same outcomes as a constitutional right.304 It is also 
possible that the Court would share Judge Ho’s concern that if 
the defendant has no way to waive his right to receive exculpatory 
evidence, then we have “imprison[ed] a man in his privileges.”305 
Second, while coextensive regimes are not inherently suspect, 
there is special reason for courts to be suspicious of a coextensive 
regime that disallows all big boy clauses made under the supervi-
sion of counsel: such a regime requires a strained interpretation 
of precedent. After all, courts often enforce big boy clauses so long 
as “the signatory knew what he was doing,”306 and the Court has 
treated statutory rights as waivable in plea agreements.307 In 
other words, courts should allow big boy clauses in at least some 
plea agreements, in order to avoid coextensive problems. Thus, 
perhaps the most optimal, realistic world is one in which defend-
ants may include big boy clauses in order to receive a more opti-
mal sentence. 
The second solution—allowing only defendants to offer big 
boy clauses—resolves the coextensive concerns with banning big 
boy clauses altogether from plea agreements. Big boy clauses 
would act as a “significant bargaining chip.”308 A defendant who 
knows he is guilty309 and is prepared to plead might offer the pros-
ecutor a big boy clause in exchange for a more favorable sentence. 
On the other hand, a prosecutor would be unable to insist that 
every plea agreement have a big boy clause. 
One must still query: What sort of defendant would this re-
gime help? This regime would help those guilty defendants who 
 
 304 See Martinez, 566 US at 19 (Scalia dissenting). 
 305 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401 (Ho concurring) (emphasis omitted), quoting Adams, 317 
US at 280. Judge Ho, after all, included his bargaining chip concern shortly after citing 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Ruiz that Brady’s unfair trial concerns are never implicated 
at the plea stage. Alvarez, 904 F3d at 399. One interpretation is that Judge Ho is explain-
ing Justice Thomas’s underlying concern. 
 306 Nightingale Home Healthcare, 589 F3d at 885 (citations omitted). 
 307 See Mezzanatto, 513 US at 210. 
 308 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401 (Ho concurring). 
 309 See Scott and Stuntz, 101 Yale L J at 1941 (cited in note 137) (“The defendant’s 
knowledge of . . . whether he is guilty or not—is a good predictor of future evidentiary 
discoveries.”). See also Douglass, 50 Emory L J at 450 (cited in note 263) (“The defendant, 
of course, typically possesses at least one piece of information that the prosecutor does not. 
He knows whether he committed the crime.”). 
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have superior information about their guilt and would thus be 
more willing to relinquish their Brady rights. Perhaps this does 
not present a problem. While the exigency of this Comment is in-
nocents pleading guilty, pre-plea disclosure serves other func-
tions, such as promoting the legitimacy of the criminal justice sys-
tem and giving all defendants a fair shake.310 Guilty defendants’ 
favorable use of big boy clauses might be a necessary collateral 
consequence of a constructive fraud regime that better protects 
innocents who plead guilty.311 Even so, as a practical matter, this 
solution is still not ideal. Setting aside practical enforcement  
issues, a defendant’s offering a big boy clause reveals that he  
has little faith in his case, putting him in a weaker bargaining  
position. 
Thus, this Comment proposes that the third solution, that of 
open bargaining, is more desirable. A big boy clause would be 
most valuable to an innocent defendant when a prosecutor offers 
it. This is the flipside of the problem with the second solution: A 
prosecutor’s offer of a big boy clause tends to show that the pros-
ecutor has some exculpatory evidence or that he is concerned that 
the defendant might get ahold of such evidence that the prosecu-
tor does not know about, but that is located in government files. 
This is valuable information to a defendant. For an innocent de-
fendant and for an attorney of a client who maintains his inno-
cence, an offer of a big boy clause should ring alarm bells. 
The major objection against open bargaining is the underly-
ing concern that, with free rein, prosecutors might begin to use 
boilerplate big boy clauses regardless of their assessment of guilt. 
Such a policy would attempt to mask any weakness in an individ-
ual case behind the veneer of a new DOJ or interoffice policy of 
including such clauses. Perhaps such a policy does not present a 
problem ex ante. After all, when it has weighed in on similar is-
sues, the Court has concluded that “[t]he mere potential for abuse 
of prosecutorial bargaining power is an insufficient basis for fore-
closing negotiation altogether.”312 
 
 310 See Green, 26 Fordham Urban L J at 634 (cited in note 256). 
 311 The law does not shy away from such arrangements. For example, while the vast 
majority of writs of habeas corpus are denied, courts put up with many meritless claims 
to preserve the few meritorious ones. See Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 498 (1953)  
(Frankfurter) (“The meritorious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those 
few claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities.”). 
 312 Mezzanatto, 513 US at 210. 
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This objection to the overuse of big boy clauses is also a mi-
crocosm of the debate in law and economics scholarship regarding 
the necessity of regulation on market failures.313 For example, the 
potential to use big boy clauses can be viewed as part of an effi-
cient market in which “[t]he defendant, who buys the plea, pays 
by surrendering his right to impose costs on the prosecutor by de-
manding trial and by surrendering his chance of acquittal at 
trial.”314 A constructive fraud appeal imposes a cost on the prose-
cutor, and a big boy clause is a way of insuring against that cost. 
In a sense, the option of a constructive fraud appeal increases the 
defendant’s bargaining power by giving him a “significant bar-
gaining chip.”315 
From the government’s perspective, a prosecutor will “accept 
a plea that exceeds the punishment his office could obtain by in-
vesting an equal amount of prosecutorial resources on other 
cases.”316 The prosecutor would indeed value big boy clauses: They 
would spare him the costs associated with having law enforce-
ment agents search all their files for exculpatory evidence to hand 
over to the defendant. Moreover, big boy clauses would reduce 
work for the prosecutor’s appellate colleagues, who could easily 
defeat any constructive fraud appeal with an attack on the reli-
ance element. If a defendant gives up his right to bring a construc-
tive fraud appeal, then that will increase the resources a prosecu-
tor’s office can use on other cases. These cost savings will, on the 
margins, incentivize prosecutors to make bargains that help de-
fendants. The fact that prosecutors value waiver of the right to 
litigate exculpatory evidence claims is evidenced by the fact that 
the prosecutor in Ruiz offered a six-month sentence reduction at 
least partly in exchange for waiver of the Giglio right.317 
By this line of reasoning, big boy clauses are beneficial to 
prosecutors and defendants, and the only overuse of a big boy 
clause occurs when an innocent person uses one. There are two 
 
 313 Some law and economics analyses would suggest that a regime that allows open 
bargaining will provide more optimal outcomes than one which is regulated, even in the 
plea-bargaining context. See, for example, Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 290 (cited in 
note 268) (“‘Regulatory failure’ plagues regulation more often than market failure disables 
markets.”). But see Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for 
Analysis, 53 NYU L Rev 783, 786 (1978) (arguing that market failures might result in 
defendants who are overcharged, which presents moral transaction costs). 
 314 Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 309 (cited in note 268). 
 315 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401 (Ho concurring). 
 316 Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 308–09 (cited in note 268). 
 317 See Ruiz, 536 US at 625. 
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reasons to think an innocent person would not use a big boy 
clause. First, many innocent defendants who plead guilty are not 
represented by counsel.318 This could occur when a defendant de-
cides to plead guilty pro se or when a defendant is not entitled to 
the assistance of counsel.319 A big boy clause agreed to by a de-
fendant without counsel is likely unenforceable.320 Second, it is 
incumbent on an innocent defendant’s counsel to refuse a big boy 
clause. A defendant is essentially using a potentially longer sen-
tence as insurance against the possibility of exculpatory evidence 
being found in the government’s files.321 
It is true that, regardless of these safeguards, some innocent 
defendants might lie to their counsel about their guilt, in order to 
receive what they believe to be a lesser sentence. In this situation, 
one could argue that a market failure is present because use of 
big boy clauses has allowed “[p]rosecutors [to] take advantage of 
ignorant defendants,” and thus it is appropriate to “subject[ ] the 
prosecutor’s decisions to regulation.”322 This is the market failure 
of coercion.323 Judge Frank Easterbrook’s response to this  
argument is to look at the sentencing differential, in which a  
defendant receives “one sentence if there is a plea, and a higher 
sentence if the defendant stands trial and is convicted.”324 Judge  
Easterbrook asks “whether the size of the [sentencing] differen-
tial may be understood as a logical consequence of the bargaining 
process.”325 If not, it is coercive.326 Take an extreme example: if a 
defendant believes he will receive a sixty-year sentence at trial or 
 
 318 See Hughes, 89 NC L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 297). 
 319 See Scott v Illinois, 440 US 367, 373–74 (1979) (“We therefore hold that the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indi-
gent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has af-
forded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”). 
 320 See Extra Equipamentos, 541 F3d at 724. 
 321 One counterargument is that if innocent defendants do not accept big boy clauses, 
and that becomes common knowledge among prosecutors, that will disincentivize guilty 
defendants from using big boy clauses to bargain at all, because doing so signals that he 
is guilty. This misunderstands that argument. This Comment does not argue that a de-
fendant’s signaling his guilt is a bad thing. After all, agreeing to a guilty plea is the ulti-
mate signal of guilt. Instead, this Comment argues that a defendant’s offering a big boy 
clause shows that he has little faith in his case. Prosecutors already require defendants to 
waive many rights in a guilty plea, and prosecutors do not see this waiver as an invitation 
to bring further charges. When a defendant offers a clause that further curtails his own 
rights, however, that would likely catch a prosecutor’s attention. 
 322 Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 300, 309 (cited in note 268). 
 323 Id at 311. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id at 312. 
 326 Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 312 (cited in note 268). 
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a six-day sentence through plea bargaining, then “even the inno-
cent will plead guilty.”327 
The question here, however, is more specific than the one 
Judge Easterbrook asks. The question is whether an innocent de-
fendant’s unwillingness to include a big boy clause would cause 
him to experience a coercive sentencing differential, which he 
would not otherwise face if he agreed to include a big boy clause. 
This is largely an empirical question that can only be determined 
ex post on a case-by-case basis, but we do have some evidence. In 
Ruiz, the plea agreement reduced the defendant’s sentence six 
months, from an eighteen-to-twenty-four month sentence to a 
twelve-to-eighteen month sentence, in exchange for her waiver of 
several rights, including her right to receive impeachment evi-
dence.328 Thus, the prosecutor reduced Ruiz’s recommended 
prison time to somewhere between two-thirds or three-quarters 
of the time she would face should she be convicted at trial. Can 
this be understood as a “logical consequence of the bargaining 
process”?329 While the time period of six months is certainly sig-
nificant for an incarcerated defendant, the sentencing differential 
(two-thirds to three-quarters of the potential prison time) does 
not seem illogical. 
Thus, it is likely that this differential was a logical conse-
quence of the bargaining process and did not coerce an innocent 
into pleading guilty. Of course, it is still possible that some big 
boy clauses could create a coercive sentencing differential. The 
point is only that the empirical evidence available to us does not 
indicate ex ante that the concern about coercion will manifest. 
Even supposing the above law and economics analysis is 
wrong, coercive use of big boy clauses would still likely not become 
widespread, because prosecutors have ample incentives not to in-
sist on such clauses. While not directly violating DOJ policy or 
ABA ethics rules about reasonably prompt disclosure, prosecutors 
who insist on using a big boy clause create a suspicious atmos-
pheric in any disciplinary proceeding. Moreover, if cases do not 
plea out, prosecutors will see increased workloads on the margins 
and thus adapt their policies accordingly.330 
 
 327 Id at 311. 
 328 Ruiz, 536 US at 625. 
 329 Easterbrook, 12 J Legal Stud at 312 (cited in note 268). 
 330 See id at 299 (“As the availability of cases and the returns per case change, so may 
the prosecution policies. This selection method is presumptively efficient for the same rea-
sons a competitive market is likely to be efficient.”). 
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While theoretically it is true that prosecutors could pressure 
defendants to employ any clause in a plea agreement, this is not 
a problem unique to big boy clauses. For instance, Assistant US 
Attorneys often used to require that any company facing an in-
dictment and seeking cooperation credit agree to cease paying the 
legal fees of its employees.331 After being excoriated for this prac-
tice in United States v Stein332 and fearing immediate congres-
sional action,333 the DOJ promulgated the Filip Memorandum, 
ending the DOJ’s practice of requiring cooperating corporations 
to cease paying employee legal fees.334 Similarly, in response to 
concerns that the DOJ was overusing corporate criminal liability, 
the Yates Memorandum restricted the instances in which prose-
cutors could bring corporate criminal prosecutions.335 Thus, even 
supposing that constructive fraud causes the criminal justice sys-
tem to contract an epidemic of big boy clauses, an important shift 
has nonetheless occurred. The debate is no longer about tenuous 
procedural due process arguments and instead about DOJ policy. 
This shift allows for democratic accountability, as demonstrated 
by the DOJ’s sensitivity to external pressures in the Filip and 
Yates memoranda. Given the already mammoth support for pre-
plea disclosure from the DOJ,336 the ABA,337 and academia,338 prac-
tically, it might be more effective to debate disclosure of exculpa-
tory evidence as a policy matter rather than as a constitutional 
matter. 
2. Adding a statement to colloquies safeguards against 
coercive use of big boy clauses. 
If concerns about prosecutors overusing big boy clauses per-
sist, there is a simple solution: add a question to the colloquy 
judges read before signing a plea agreement. The rationale for 
 
 331 Mark Filip, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations *1, 13 (De-
partment of Justice, Aug 28, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/E4HH-HG9D. 
 332 435 F Supp 2d 330 (SDNY 2006), affd 541 F3d 130 (2d Cir 2008). 
 333 Charles Wm. McIntyre, Howard C. Vick, and Michael J. Elston, McNulty Memo 
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Sept 14, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/7CPQ-RJLK. 
 334 See Filip, Principles of Federal Prosecution at *1 (cited in note 331). 
 335 See generally Sally Q. Yates, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing 
(Department of Justice, Sept 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MP6K-G6YV. 
 336 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 410 (Costa dissenting). 
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colloquies is that “well-placed reminders” reduce the chance of vi-
olating a defendant’s rights.339 Colloquies in federal court must 
list several constitutional rights of which a defendant could avail 
himself by taking a case to trial,340 followed by a question to the 
effect of: “Do you understand the rights I have just explained?”341 
Adding the Brady right could take myriad forms, but a basic ver-
sion might read as follows: “You give up the right to receive any 
exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.” A brack-
eted section of this statement could say, “[IF PLEADING WITH 
A NO-RELIANCE CLAUSE]: You are pleading guilty of your own 
free will without reliance on the exculpatory evidence or lack 
thereof in the government’s possession.”342 
Adding a single statement to the colloquy is a minor revision. 
Practically, Brady could find its way into colloquies in two ways. 
First, Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
lists the various rights that “the court must inform the defendant 
of, and determine that the defendant understands.”343 An amend-
ment to this list could include the Brady right. Second, without 
any amendment, individual judges are free to “inform a defendant 
about specific consequences that might follow from a plea of guilty 
if the judge ‘feels a consequence of a plea of guilty in a particular 
case is likely to be of real significance to the defendant.’”344 Such 
judicial oversight of big boy clauses is already commonplace. For 
instance, if a person is not a “big boy” and lacks counsel, courts 
become skeptical about enforcing big boy clauses.345 Courts, there-
fore, examine the circumstances to determine if “the signatory 
knew what he was doing.”346 
In short, big boy clauses are the redeeming quality of this 
Comment’s constructive fraud regime, saving the regime from the 
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quagmire of coextensive solutions. Law and economics shows that 
prosecutors would be unlikely to abuse big boy clauses, and a 
modification to colloquies can ensure judicial oversight and quell 
the remaining concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
George Alvarez, a special education high school student, 
spent four years in prison because he pleaded guilty to a crime 
that, according to the state court, he did not commit. Alvarez re-
mained incarcerated because prosecutors failed to disclose excul-
patory evidence that would have proven Alvarez’s innocence. The 
problem for defendants like Alvarez is that even with exculpatory 
evidence in hand, the Bagley/Ruiz syllogism precludes them from 
getting relief under Brady. 
Thus, this Comment suggests that those concerned about in-
nocent defendants who plead guilty, like Alvarez, should rely less 
on due process and more on contract law arguments. This Com-
ment proposes a constructive fraud solution, which better maps 
onto the plea-bargaining context, along with modifications to plea 
colloquies. 
This solution is superior not only to due process arguments, 
but also to other contract law arguments for pre-plea disclosure. 
It avoids reliance on a strained interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent. In addition, it avoids the coextensive shell game by 
showing that big boy clauses create a practical difference between 
a constructive fraud regime and a due process right to pre-plea 
disclosure. Finally, as a matter of policy, prosecutors are unlikely 
to use big boy clauses in a coercive fashion, and big boy clauses 
give defendants more leverage in asking for a sentencing reduc-
tion. Thus, constructive fraud is a suitable solution because it is 
logically cogent and, unlike arguments extending Brady pre-plea, 
a constructive fraud solution declines to “imprison a man in his 
privileges and call it the Constitution.”347 
 
 347 Alvarez, 904 F3d at 401 (Ho concurring) (emphasis omitted), quoting Adams, 317 
US at 280. 
